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DILIGENT ZERO
Frédéric Gilles Sourgens*

ABSTRACT
Energy transition policies will soon transform the backbone of our globalized economy. Problematically, leading policymakers advocate for a form
of energy system shock therapy: they argue we should abandon fossil fuels
to achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions as soon as technically feasible. Because current energy systems have deep structural importance for
our daily lives and determine everything from where we live to how we
work, such shock therapy has potentially catastrophic economic, social,
and cultural consequences around the world. I argue that we can achieve
meaningful energy transition success without such catastrophic consequences if we pivot from a net zero policy focus to a diligent zero legal
perspective; this perspective holistically promotes the progressive realization of human rights, as well as environmental and climate commitments.
The literature has already identified the crucial importance of due diligence
for policymakers and business executives in the context of climate and environmental law, human rights, and corporate governance. What the literature has missed so far is that energy transition diligence can only guide
energy transition decision-making if we conduct such diligence holistically
rather than piecemeal in siloed and competing climate, environmental,
human rights, and corporate governance due diligence streams.
I argue that a holistic energy transition diligence is possible, and in fact
compatible, with existing climate, environmental, and human rights regimes. I provide a map for conducting energy transition diligence. Diligent
Zero is the first article to argue for such a holistic diligence approach to
energy transition and gives lawyers a focal point for securing an equitable
and sustainable energy transition process.
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I. INTRODUCTION

T

HE future of world society depends on our ability to manage the
coming energy transition.1 If we come up short, we may cause an
ecological collapse that will take world society down with it.2 But
acting brings peril in itself. For example, electric cars use minerals that
are toxic to produce.3 Not only that, recent reports suggest that major
solar panel producers rely on forced labor associated with an ongoing
genocide.4 And energy transition itself can bring entire economies to
their knees. For example, economies like the Republic of the Congo
(Congo) are entirely dependent upon the export of fossil fuels.5 Take

1. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF
1.5°C vi (Valerie M. Delmotte et al. eds. 2018) [hereinafter IPCC 1.5° C], https://
www.ipcc.ch/sr15 [https://perma.cc/C7ET-Z6W7].
2. See Paul R. Ehrlich & Anne H. Ehrlich, Can a Collapse of Global Civilization Be
Avoided?, 280 PROC. OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y B: BIOLOGICAL SCIS., Mar. 7, 2013, at 3 (arguing that global civilization risks collapse due to anthropogenic climate change).
3. See, e.g., Rick Mills, Copper, The Most Critical Metal, MINING.COM (Dec. 6, 2020,
12:04 PM), https://www.mining.com/web/copper-the-most-critical-metal [https://perma.cc/
FXG5-99VL] (“The latest use for copper is in renewable energy, particularly in photovoltaic cells used for solar power, and wind turbines.”); Annie Kelly, Pollution Causing Birth
Defects in Children of DRC Cobalt Miners–Study, GUARDIAN (May 6, 2020, 3:15 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/may/06/pollution-causing-birth-defects-in-children-of-drc-cobalt-miners-study [https://perma.cc/X69S-D5DC] (“Thousands
of people in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are being exposed to dangerous
levels of toxic pollution that is causing birth defects in their children as they mine for cobalt
used to make rechargeable batteries for smartphpones, laptops, and electric cars . . . .”).
4. Ana Swanson & Chris Buckley, Chinese Solar Companies Tied to Use of Forced
Labor, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/08/business/economy/
china-solar-companies-forced-labor-xinjiang.html [https://perma.cc/MBK6-4D98]; see Peter
Mattis, Yes, the Atrocities in Xinjiang Constitute a Genocide, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 15,
2021, 1:14 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/15/xinjiang-uyghurs-intentional-genocide-china [https://perma.cc/9MDU-Q5HH] (outlining China’s systematic destruction of
the Uyghers); see also John Hudson, As Tensions with China Grow, Biden Administration
Formalizes Genocide Declaration Against Beijing, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2021, 4:54 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/china-genocide-human-rights-report/
2021/03/30/b2fa8312-9193-11eb-9af7-fd0822ae4398_story.html [https://perma.cc/J74MBCM2].
5. CONTRIBUTION PRÉVUE DÉTERMINÉE AU NIVEAU NATIONAL [NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN] 2 (Sept. 21, 2015) [hereinafter Congo-NDC], https://
www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Congo%20First/
NDC_Congo_RAPPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT4Z-7QWS].
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away that income, and the country faces economic ruin. It is not clear
which path we should take to manage the energy transition, nor at what
cost. Neither is it clear what criteria we should use in making that
decision.
The dominant approach is to think of energy transition as a political
economy problem.6 Policymakers in particular seek to develop “the most
technically feasible, cost-effective and socially acceptable” energy transition solution.7 Such an approach focuses on price tags (estimated to be
around $4.5 trillion in new investments by 2050)8 and seeks to distribute
costs and impacts efficiently.9 The high costs will doubtless have significant impacts on developing economies,10 but this approach justifies the
costs in terms of the significantly higher costs of inaction.11
There is a catch, however. While efficiency is obviously important,12 so
are equity concerns.13 What should we do when efficiency and equity
point in different directions? I argue that we can only answer this question when we begin to think about global energy transition policies
through a legal lens. Surprisingly, the current leading policy proposals on
energy transition do not rely on the law to guide energy transition decision-making at all.14 Such oversight by global policymakers obscures the
importance of the distribution of environmental, climate law, and human
rights consequences.15 Thus, it is true that energy transition will demand
6. For a thoughtful and nuanced introduction to the political economy of energy transition, see DOUGLAS ARENT, CHANNING ARNDT, MACKAY MILLER, FINN TARP & OWEN
ZINAMAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CLEAN ENERGY TRANSITIONS (2017).
7. Int’l Energy Agency [IEA], Net Zero by 2050, A Roadmap for the Global Energy
Sector, at 3 (May 17, 2021) [hereinafter IEA-2050 Report], https://
iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/deebef5d-0c34-4539-9d0c-10b13d840027/NetZeroby2050ARoadmapfortheGlobalEnergySector_CORR.pdf [https://perma.cc/P83H-7SY6].
8. See id. at 81.
9. See id. at 55 (prioritizing new, sustainable infrastructure over updating existing
structures due to the relative impact each would have).
10. See id. at 82 (noting that “direct government financing” is necessary for the infrastructure development needed to reach energy goals, particularly in developing
economies).
11. Id. at 157 ([I]mpacts are likely to be lower than assessments of the cost of climate
change damage . . . .”).
12. Id. at 55.
13. ARENT, ARNDT, MILLER, TARP & ZINAMAN, supra note 6, at 11.
14. Such proposals include the benchmark 2021 report by the International Energy
Agency, IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, passim, and policymaking by the World Bank
Group, such as its conclusions about the economic and political motivations of fossil fueldependent countries’ energy systems, GREGORZ PESZKO ET AL., WORLD BANK GROUP
[WBG], DIVERSIFICATION AND COOPERATION IN A DECARBONIZING WORLD passim
(2020), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/34011/
9781464813405.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/52VA-6J4U]. Arguably,
the European Union’s recent “Green Deal” suffers from the same deficiency. See Delivering the European Green Deal, EUR. COMM’N (July 14, 2021) [hereinafter EU Proposal],
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/delivering-european-green-deal_en [https://perma.cc/57A7-JE6K].
15. See infra Part II. Inequality arising as an equity concern is arguably also a matter
of network power—power that tends to be concentrated as a historical matter. See DAVID
SINGH GREWAL, NETWORK POWER: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF GLOBALIZATION 142
(2008). As a methodological matter, see also MATTHEW E. KAHN, ADAPTING TO CLIMATE
CHANGE: MARKETS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 11–12 (2021)
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mobilization of all of world society to outlive the climate change threat.16
Success will demand sacrifice.17 But it still must account for an additional
variable that is currently missing: the distribution of relative burdens and
benefits of energy transition.18
In this Article, I argue that lawyers have a central role to play in getting
energy transition right. Instead of considering feasibility, cost-effectiveness, and social acceptability each in its own right, lawyers must ask if our
policies meet climate and environmental obligations holistically while
also realizing human rights.19 Lawyers must ask these questions at the
very earliest stage—the legal regimes governing energy policies and
projects necessitate due diligence in their application. This diligence requirement is a matter of international human rights law,20 environmental
law,21 and domestic law, such as administrative rulemaking.22 Just as importantly, companies also must engage in human rights and environmental diligence before making important investment decisions.23
The key problem is that energy transition policies are subject to inconsistent due diligence regimes, including climate diligence, environmental
diligence, and human rights diligence. This inconsistency can lead to
deadlock. For example, environmental law facially prohibits the killing of
(noting the difference in impact of climate change on poor and wealthy households and the
increasingly powerful feedback loop between poverty and climate hazard).
16. See IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 50.
17. See id. at 67–69.
18. Macroeconomic research arguably does not even intend to study such a relative
sharing of burdens and benefits but rather focuses on net results. For a discussion of the
negative consequences of this perspective, see BINYAMIN APPELBAUM, THE ECONOMISTS’
HOUR 330 (2019).
19. See generally Tade Oyewunmi, Penelope Crossley, Kim Talus & Frédéric Sourgens,
Introduction: Energy in a Carbon-Constrained World, in DECARBONISATION AND THE ENERGY INDUSTRY: LAW, POLICY AND REGULATION IN LOW-CARBON ENERGY MARKETS 1
(Tade Oyewunmi, Penelope Crossley, Kim Talus & Frédéric Sourgens eds., 2020) (outlining the goals of a comprehensive, law-based approach to energy transition).
20. See DIANE A. DESIERTO, PUBLIC POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 159
(2015) [hereinafter DESIERTO PUBLIC POLICY].
21. See PHILIPPE SANDS, JACQUELINE PEEL, ADRIANA FABRA & RUTH MACKENZIE,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 499 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 4th
ed. 2018); DANIEL BODANSKY, JUTTA BRUNNÉE & LAVANYA RAJAMANI, INTERNATIONAL
CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 41–48 (2017).
22. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Continuity and Transformation in Environmental Regulation, 10 ARIZ. J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (2019) (discussing collaborative climate governance); Gabriel Pacyniak, Making the Most of Cooperative Federalism: What the Clean
Power Plan Has Already Achieved, 29 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 301, 333 (2017) (discussing
traditional notice and comment regulation); Albert C. Lin, Myths of Environmental Law,
2015 UTAH L. REV. 45, 56 (2015) (discussing NEPA diligence).
23. U.N. Secretary-General, The Report of the Working Group on the Issue of Human
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, ¶¶ 10–15, U.N.
Doc. A/73/163 (July 16, 2018); Churchill Mining PLC v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case
No. ARB/12/14 and 12/40, Award, ¶¶ 516–27 (Dec. 6, 2016). This requirement is frequently
a matter of domestic corporate and securities law. See Veronica Root Martinez, Complex
Compliance Investigations, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 249 (2020); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 17 (2006). And it is now part
and parcel of corporate culture at leading energy and mining companies. Ray Chartier &
Kellie L. Johnston, ESG Considerations in Oil and Gas Deals: Risks and Opportunities
(Canada & Globally), 18 OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. INTEL. 1, 5 (2020).
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endangered birds, but it is a climate imperative to expand wind power
despite the fact that it does, in fact, kill endangered birds.24 To help energy transition policymakers, lawyers must be able to resolve this
deadlock.25
This deadlock can be resolved. The different diligence regimes must be
combined into a single decision matrix. We must consider the impacts of
energy transition policies holistically rather than piecemeal.26 This approach is fundamentally consistent with recent climate change jurisprudence like the German Constitutional Court’s 2021 landmark climate
decision in Neubauer v. Germany.27
We now need to translate this holistic approach to due diligence regimes. Holistic diligence must collect data and assess risks across the entire spectrum of potential energy transition, climate, environmental, and
human rights impacts.28 This includes not just the projects themselves but
also the supply chains on which they rely.29 We then must develop a risk
mitigation strategy that accounts for the complex risks energy systems
and supply chains create.30 Diligence must propose maximally ambitious
pathways, even if some risks cannot be accounted for without undermining the bigger energy transition effort.31 Finally, we need to build monitoring and adaptation programs to assess and correct policies and projects
once we see their actual impacts.32
This approach offers five key insights. First, energy transition policies
and projects can only be successful if they robustly engage stakeholders
24. See Wildlife Concerns Associated with Wind Energy Development, U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/midwest/wind/wildlifeimpacts/index.html [https://
perma.cc/7UE3-QZGJ].
25. See generally IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 3 (“[T]hat pathway remains narrow and extremely challenging, requiring all stakeholders . . . to take action this year and
every year after so that the goal does not slip out of reach.”).
26. Surprisingly little work has been done to date on holistic diligence. For one recent
exception, see generally Chiara Macchi, The Climate Change Dimension of Business and
Human Rights: The Gradual Consolidation of a Concept of “Climate Due Diligence,” 6
BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 93 (2021). Macchi argues that climate, environmental, and human
rights obligations for corporations are mutually reinforcing, thus suggesting a holistic approach to due diligence. Id. at 93. As I will discuss later, this is more problematic in the
policy space in which environmental, climate, and human rights law may in fact point in
different directions.
27. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Mar. 24,
2021, 157 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 270 (2021) (Ger.)
[hereinafter Neubauer].
28. See infra Part II.
29. See Melissa J. Durkee, Interpretive Entrepreneurs, 107 VA. L. REV. 431, 473–75
(2021) (discussing the problems of global supply chain diligence); Rachel Chambers & Anil
Yilmaz Vastardis, Human Rights Disclosure and Due Diligence Laws: The Role of Regulatory Oversight in Ensuring Corporate Accountability, 21 CHI. J. INT’L L. 323, 327 (2021)
(discussing the relative dearth of legislative actions on supply chain diligence to date).
30. See Albert C. Lin, The Missing Pieces of Geoengineering Research Governance,
100 MINN. L. REV. 2509, 2542 (2016) (“Existing energy systems are deeply resistant to
change because of their long-lived and extensive infrastructure, as well as their complex
and interrelated components.”).
31. See infra Section III.B.
32. See infra Section III.C.
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and local communities from the earliest due diligence stages through
monitoring and implementation.33 Transparent communication and buyin from affected communities make the difference between successful and
unsuccessful energy transition policies and projects. The law governing
due diligence supports both; a heavy-handed, top-down approach, however well-intentioned, supports neither.
Second, we can develop several diligent zero pathways, not just one
narrow net zero pathway.34 We can look to increase feasible environmental protection, climate achievement, or human rights realization without
reducing one of the other outcomes. That is, we look for Pareto optimal
pathways to energy transition.35 With few caveats, policymakers can
adopt each Pareto optimal pathway in light of their respective values and
community needs. This approach is fundamentally consistent with the
bottom-up climate governance approach adopted in the 2015 Paris
Agreement.36 And it provides a means to engage more fully to secure
buy-in from relevant energy transition stakeholders.
Third, energy transition progress must never be achieved on the back
of serious impairments of human rights and the right to development.37
Both climate change and energy transition threaten the right to development and the realization of human rights.38 Diligent energy transition
policies must ensure that those most severely affected by such policies do
33. See OWEN L. AENDERSON, JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI,
JOHN S. LOWE, KEITH B. HALL & FRÉDÉRIC GILLES SOURGENS, INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM LAW AND TRANSACTIONS 682–707 (2020) (discussing the importance of stakeholder
engagement in community development agreements); Pacyniak, supra note 22, at 333 (discussing the same in the notice-and-comment context).
34. See IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 3–4 (“There is no one-size-fits-all approach
to clean energy transitions.”).
35. See Jesse D. Jenkins & Valerie J. Karplus, Carbon Pricing Under Political Constraints: Insights for Accelerating Clean Energy Transitions, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF CLEAN ENERGY TRANSITIONS 39, 41 (Douglas Arent, Channing Arndt, Mackay Miller,
Finn Tarp & Owen Zinaman eds., 2017) (discussing Pareto optimality in the climate mitigation context).
36. Catherine Powell, We the People: These United Divided States, 40 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2685, 2719 (2019) (“The road from the 1992 Rio Earth Summit to the 2015 Paris
Agreement illustrates a shift from the more traditional, top-down, ‘regulatory’ approach to
a more polycentric, bottom-up, ‘catalytic’ approach.”)
37. The right to development is associated with the third generation of human rights
treaties. CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 137
(3d ed., 2014). There is ongoing treaty codification of this right. Zamir Akram (ChairRapporteur of the Human Rights Council Working Group on the Right to Development),
Draft Convention on the Right to Development, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.2/21/2, at 1 (Jan.
17, 2020) [hereinafter Development Convention], https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/Session21/3_A_HRC_WG.2_21_2_AdvanceEditedVersion.pdf [https://
perma.cc/P94N-6H2U]. As discussed in a recent U.N. session on the right to development,
the right to development is “integral to the realisation of all other rights.” Michelle
Bachelet (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Opening remarks to the
21st Session of the Intergovernmental Working Group on the Right to Development, (May
17, 2021), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=
27097&LangID=y [https://perma.cc/5AFR-4AC4]. It is therefore not a right that should be
limited to the third generation of human rights treaties. It encompasses all generations of
positive and negative rights. Development Convention, supra note 37, art. 6(2).
38. See TOMUSCHAT, supra note 37, at 134–37 (explaining the interrelated nature of
various human rights).
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not lose the progress made in human rights realization since
decolonization.39
Fourth, energy transition policies endanger the resilience of energy systems at their peril. Any policy that impairs resilience will likely be met by
defection by stakeholders, which will undercut the implementation of the
policies and projects in question.40 Worse still, it is likely to be accompanied by self-help, which itself poses a serious threat to climate change
mitigation.41
Fifth, energy transition must rely on a broad energy policy mix to
achieve a robust yet manageable transition process. This pathway is likely
to lean on hydrogen and small modular reactor nuclear as a significant
component of our global energy future;42 it will likely also look to carbon
capture and carbon removal.43 Further, transition is likely to consider solar radiation management as a tool to buy time to establish supply chains
and energy infrastructure in a sustainable manner.44
These insights are relevant to global and U.S. due diligence efforts.
President Biden has ordered the federal government to conduct climate
impact due diligence under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).45 The Paris framework coordinates similar global efforts.46 Both
the U.S. and global efforts can draw on the diligent zero approach to
inform their choices.
My argument for a diligent zero approach is not just a technical legal
argument. It is ethical. We cannot achieve our energy goals on the backs
39. See Development Convention, supra note 37, art. 4(1) (“[A]ll peoples have the
inalienable right to development . . . based on all other human rights and fundamental
freedoms.”). See also Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court],
Mar. 24, 2021, 157, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 270 (2021)
(Ger.). 1 BvR 2656/18 at 42–43; MARIA MONNHEIMER, DUE DILIGENCE OBLIGATIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 291 (2021).
40. See infra Part IV.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 355–56.
42. See Phred Dvorak, Japan’s Big Hydrogen Bet To Revolutionize Energy Market,
WALL ST. J., (June 13, 2021, 2:08 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/japans-big-bet-on-hydrogen-could-revolutionize-the-energy-market-11623607695 [https://perma.cc/AW8E56WZ]; Bruce R. Huber, The New Nuclear? Small Modular Reactors and the Future of
Nuclear Power, 1 NOTRE DAME J. EMERGING TECH. 458, 460 (2020).
43. See Nichola Groom & Hyunjoo Jin, Tesla CEO Musk Puts $100 mln Jolt into
Quest for Carbon Removal, REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2021, 4:39 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
business/autos-transportation/tesla-ceo-musk-puts-100-mln-jolt-into-quest-carbon-removal-2021-04-22 [https://perma.cc/K7KN-8NU9]; Fiona Harvey, Boris Johnson Urges Major Economies To Go Carbon Neutral by 2050, GUARDIAN (Feb. 4, 2020, 1:19 EST), https://
www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/feb/03/pm-urges-major-economies-to-go-carbonneutral-by-2050 [https://perma.cc/HRV5-P2BT].
44. See Jeff Tollefson, US Urged To Invest in Sun-Dimming Studies as Climate Warms,
NATURE (Mar. 29, 2021), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-00822-5 [https://
perma.cc/7S3V-DQZ3] (discussing new research to “artificially cool Earth”).
45. Exec. Order 13,990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037, 7042 § 7(e) (Jan. 20, 2021); Memorandum
from Christina Goldfuss, Couns. on Env’t Quality, Exec. Off. of the President, to Heads of
Federal Departments and Agencies (Aug. 1, 2016) [hereinafter NEPA-Guidance], https://
ceq.doe.gov/docs/ceq-regulations-and-guidance/nepa_final_ghg_guidance.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6RMU-Y9B].
46. See IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 3.

424

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

of others. I cannot ask anyone to endure catastrophic ecosystem collapse
while I remain sheltered in my technological bubble.47 And I cannot ask
anyone to make deep sacrifices in the name of energy transition while I
continue to enjoy a good life.48 To do either is to deny others moral
agency.49 Plenitude at the cost of dehumanizing my neighbor is morally
corrosive. Such moral corrosion ends in tragedy—even when it is effective, it transforms my life into a fearful pursuit of continued domination
of my supposed lesser. A life lived in such fearful pursuit of dominion
impoverishes all.50 Prudence and diligence guard against its beginning
and against the tug of convenience away from the advice of conscience.
Diligence, therefore, is more than a legal technicality. It is imperative for
an ethical energy transition.
This Article has five parts. Part I outlines the energy transition conundrum and introduces the IEA-2050 Report. Part II outlines how a legal
diligence approach can resolve the energy transition conundrum. Part III
outlines the reasonableness paradigm guiding diligent decision-making.
Part IV argues that in this factually specific exercise of diligent judgment,
human rights—and particularly the right to development—take the first
position among equals. Part VI then provides various potential applications of the diligence framework that provide alternative pathways to energy transition.
II. THE ENERGY TRANSITION CONUNDRUM
On its face, energy transition should be reasonably straightforward to
manage. Greenhouse gas emissions drive world temperatures up, which
changes the global climate.51 Ecosystems cannot adapt as fast as tempera47. See generally POPE FRANCIS, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Fratelli Tutti of the Holy Father
Francis on Fraternity and Social Friendship ¶¶ 16–17, 30 (Oct. 3, 2020), https://
www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20201003_enciclica-fratelli-tutti.html [https://perma.cc/R2FL-6R5X] ([W]e need to
think of ourselves more and more as a single family dwelling in a common home.”); STEPHEN M. GARDINER, A PERFECT MORAL STORM: THE ETHICAL TRAGEDY OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 336–45 (2011) (“In current climate policy . . . the needs and aspirations of the less
privileged should be taken into account in any agreement, so that it is not constructed
solely for the benefit of the rich.”).
48. See generally POPE FRANCIS, supra note 47, at ¶ 22 (condemning the exploitation
of others for development and economic growth); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE
254–55 (2d ed. 1984) (similarly criticizing modern political structures that elevate individualism over community interests); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS
106–09 (2d ed. 2011) (“Put yourself in your neighbours’ shoes . . . . Do not (without special
reason) prevent others for getting for themselves what you are trying to get for yourself.”).
49. See POPE FRANCIS, supra note 47, at ¶ 20; MACINTYRE, supra note 48, at 251–52;
FINNIS, supra note 48, at 106–09.
50. See POPE FRANCIS, supra note 47, at ¶ 113 (“Every society needs to ensure that
values are passed on; otherwise, what is handed down are selfishness, violence, corruption
in its various forms, indifference, and, ultimately, a life closed to transcendence and intrenched in individual interests.”); POPE FRANCIS, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Laudato Si’ of the
Holy Father Francis on Care for our Common Home ¶ 229 (May 24, 2015), https://
www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html [https://perma.cc/GJ95-NMEQ].
51. See IPCC 1.5°C, supra note 1, at 4.
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tures keep rising.52 Cities like New Delhi have become nearly unlivable
for a large number of people.53 It stands to reason that we should simply
stop emitting greenhouse gases as fast as possible.54 The most direct way
of doing so is to simply stop producing and burning fossil fuels.55 This
equation is the received wisdom of energy transition.56
This approach does not work as well as we might hope because of the
central role energy plays in world society. Energy systems affect almost
every aspect of our daily lives.57 Energy systems dictate how we work,
what education is available to us, and even how we worship (Zoom is not
carbon neutral).58 They determine how we commute to work,59 which in
turn can affect where we can live.60 It affects if we can turn on an air
conditioner.61 Energy systems also affect what foods we can eat and store
because of the energy intensity of food processing.62 Unsurprisingly, energy systems indirectly affect employment. For instance, Disney alone
used to employ more than 100,000 workers at its U.S. theme parks and
welcomed more than 159 million travelers at its resorts globally, many of
52. See id. at 8.
53. Somini Sengupta, In India, Summer Heat Could Soon Be Unbearable, N.Y. TIMES
(July 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/17/climate/india-heat-wave-summer.html
[https://perma.cc/CDU7-CQMB]. See also ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO,
GOOD ECONOMICS FOR HARD TIMES 221 (Christine Marra ed., 2019).
54. David Biello, 10 Solutions for Climate Change, SCI. AM. (Nov. 26, 2007), https://
www.scientificamerican.com/article/10-solutions-for-climate-change [https://perma.cc/
2DS8-UQEB]; Allyson Shaw, 13 Ways to Save the Earth from Climate Change, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC KIDS, https://kids.nationalgeographic.com/nature/save-the-earth/article/13-waysto-save-the-earth-from-climate-change [https://perma.cc/3DKK-3QVD].
55. Tim Donaghy, 8 Reasons Why We Need to Phase Out the Fossil Fuel Industry,
GREENPEACE (Nov. 22, 2021), https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/research/8-reasons-why-weneed-to-phase-out-the-fossil-fuel-industry [ https://perma.cc/WX22-WU8U].
56. See GARDINER, supra note 47, at 341; Damian Carrington, Greta Thunberg Tells
World Leaders To End Fossil Fuel ‘Madness,’ GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2020, 8:03 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/jan/10/greta-thunberg-tells-world-leaders-to-endfossil-fuel-madness [https://perma.cc/G2UE-YQ7T].
57. See WORLD ECON. F., ENERGY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH: ENERGY VISION UPDATE 2012 7 (2021), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_EN_EnergyEconomicGrowth_
IndustryAgenda_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/26LU-BTK9] (“Energy is an input for nearly
all goods and services.”).
58. Lindsey McGinnis, Zoom Isn’t Carbon-Free. The Climate Costs of Staying Home,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/2021/
0305/Zoom-isn-t-carbon-free.-The-climate-costs-of-staying-home [https://perma.cc/5TGW57ZX].
59. See Stephanie Kelly & Laila Kearney, U.S. Gasoline Shortage Eases, but Pumps
Dry in Some Areas, REUTERS (May 16, 2021, 10:39 AM), https://www.reuters.com/business/
energy/us-gasoline-shortage-improves-some-regions-still-suffer-hefty-outages-2021-05-16
[https://perma.cc/NKA2-FYT5].
60. Real estate prices in New York increase by proximity to subway stations. James
Barron, The Subway Is Next Door. Should New Yorkers Pay Extra for That?, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/29/nyregion/subway-real-estate-nyc.html
[https://perma.cc/WZV3-6EM3].
61. See Air Conditioning Accounts for About 12% of U.S. Home Energy Expenditures,
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 23, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36692 [https://perma.cc/5Z7S-DMRJ].
62. Alia Ladha-Sabhur, Serafim Bakalis, Peter J. Fryer & Estefania Lopez-Quiroga,
Mapping Energy Consumption in Food Manufacturing, 86 TRENDS IN FOOD SCI. & TECH.
270, 270 (2019).
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whom travel to the resorts by plane.63 The data centers that support digital platforms like Google and Slack are responsible for as much energy
consumption as the airline industry, and Bitcoin annually consumes the
same amount of electricity as the whole of Sweden.64 Energy transition,
therefore, will have lasting impacts on a host of industries across all economic sectors and create equity issues for workers and consumers.
Energy policy also has an outsized global impact. Our current energy
systems rely on global supply chains.65 In fact, fossil fuels are the sole
source of meaningful state income for some developing nations like
Congo.66 Similarly, the existing energy infrastructure is key for developing states to industrialize and meet development goals.67 Energy transition policy will affect the ability of developing states to industrialize and
consequently affect global supply chains for basic goods and services.68
The manner in which we implement energy transition can have potentially catastrophic effects in the developing world.
Because of these complexities, the IEA-2050 Report’s strategy was
keenly anticipated.69 The IEA is a nonpartisan institution.70 The report
rests on a political economy approach.71 Its analysis relies on economic
63. Brooks Barnes, Disney Lays Off 28,000, Mostly at Its 2 U.S. Theme Parks, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/29/business/disney-theme-parkworkers-layoffs.html [https://perma.cc/SRL5-JA62] (“Disney’s theme parks in California
and Florida employed roughly 110,000 people before the pandemic.”); Adrienne Jordan,
These Are the World’s Most-Visited Theme Parks, USA TODAY (May 23, 2019), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/travel/news/2019/05/23/disney-world-magic-kingdom-world-mostvisited-theme-park/1206310001 [https://perma.cc/J5WU-FZUF]; Orlando International Airport Ends 2019 with Record 50.6 Million Passengers, ORLANDO AIRPORTS (Feb. 11, 2020),
https://orlandoairports.net/press/2020/02/11/orlando-international-airport-ends-2019-withrecord-50-6-million-passengers [https://perma.cc/6463-XL36] (reporting 50.6 million annual
passengers at Orlando airport).
64. Nic Carter, How Much Energy Does Bitcoin Actually Consume?, HARV. BUS.
REV. (May 5, 2021), https://hbr.org/2021/05/how-much-energy-does-bitcoin-actually-consume [ https://perma.cc/DES2-YVDM]; McGinnis, supra note 58, at 2–3.
65. See DANIEL YERGIN, THE NEW MAP: ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE CLASH OF NATIONS 156 (2020) (discussing the relationship between fossil fuels and economic growth in
China).
66. Congo-NDC, supra note 5, at 2.
67. See Namit Sharma, Bram Smeets & Christer Tryggestad, The Decoupling of GDP
and Energy Growth: A CEO Guide, MCKINSEY Q. 1, 1–4 (Apr. 24, 2019), https://
www.mckinsey.com/industries/electric-power-and-natural-gas/our-insights/the-decouplingof-gdp-and-energy-growth-a-ceo-guide [https://perma.cc/R5XB-7MJM]. This report surmises that energy demand will plateau despite growth opportunities worldwide. Id. Notably, even this report suggests that the decoupling occurs predominantly in post-industrial
economies rather than industrializing economies. Id.
68. See id. at 9.
69. See IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 3.
70. See Mission, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (Nov. 26, 2020), https://www.iea.org/about/
mission [https://perma.cc/F9B9-JU6Y].
71. Compare IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 47–49 (setting out the method for
creating the recommended net zero emission pathway), with Michael Veseth, Political
Economy, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/political-economy [https://
perma.cc/5FNJ-GZDP] (“[P]olitical economy, branch of social science that studies the relationships between individuals and society and between markets and the state, using a
diverse set of tools and methods drawn largely from economics, political science, and
sociology.”).
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modeling, and in turn, these models drive the IEA’s proposals.72
Representative of the political economy approach on which it rests, the
report proposes “the most technically feasible, cost-effective and socially
acceptable” path for energy transition.73 The report sets out that the “key
pillars of decarbonisation of the global energy system are energy efficiency, behavioural changes, electrification, renewables, hydrogen and
hydrogen-based fuels, bioenergy and [carbon capture, utilization, and
storage, or] CCUS.”74 Emission reductions are premised in part on behavioral changes, 75% of which “are achieved through targeted government policies supported by infrastructure development, e.g., a shift to rail
travel supported by high-speed railways.”75 Much of the plan also depends on infrastructure investment in low emission, renewables-generated electricity.76
The IEA’s plan is audacious. It projects that “[t]he share of renewables
in total electricity generation globally increases from 29% in 2020 to over
60% in 2030 and to nearly 90% in 2050.”77 The report spells out that, to
achieve this end, “annual capacity additions of wind and solar between
2020 and 2050 [must be] five-times higher than the average over the last
three years.”78 The report then adds CCUS as an additional tool to
“provid[e] a way to address emissions from some of the most challenging
sectors.”79 Even with carbon capture, the report projects a reduction in
the global electricity mix of coal from approximately 35% in 2020, to
about 8% in 2030, and next to 0% in 2050; and of gas from approximately
23% in 2020, to about 17% in 2030, and less than 1% in 2050.80 In fact,
according to the report, “no exploration for new [oil] resources is required and, other than fields already approved for development, no new
oil fields are necessary.”81
The IEA’s recommendations already drive policymaking. On July 14,
2021, the European Commission announced a plan to reduce the European Union’s (EU) greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030.82 The proposal tracks the IEA’s recommendations: it “proposes to increase the
binding target of renewable sources in the EU’s energy mix,” doubling
the share of renewables in the energy mix.83 This increase is consistent
72. IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 47–49.
73. Id. at 3.
74. Id. at 64.
75. Id. at 68.
76. Id. at 70, 73.
77. Id. at 73.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 79.
80. Id. at 117.
81. Id. at 101.
82. EU Proposal, supra note 14 (“All 27 EU member states . . . pledged to reduce
emissions by at least 55% by 2030, compared to 1990 levels.”).
83. Id.; Overall Share of Energy from Renewable Sources, EUROSTAT (Jan. 15, 2021),
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=file:Share_of_energy_
from_renewable_sources_2019_data,15Jan2021.JPG [https://perma.cc/MZ75-DLEY].
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with IEA recommendations.84 Similarly, the European Commission’s
proposal “to increase energy efficiency targets at [the] EU level and
make them binding” is consistent with IEA recommendations.85 The
same is true in broad outlines for the remainder of the policy proposals.
As audacious as the plan is, it runs into problems precisely when it
comes to the knock-on effects of energy transition policies. This is problematic, given the IEA’s own goal remains that “clean energy transitions
must be fair and inclusive, leaving nobody behind.”86 For example, the
IEA report acknowledges that “[t]he decline in fossil fuel use and prices
results in a fall in GDP in the producer economies, where revenues from
oil and gas sales often cover a large share of public spending on education, health care[,] and other public services.”87 The IEA does not account for this problem in its transition policy plan outright. Rather, it
notes that “[s]tructural reforms would be needed to address the societal
challenges.”88 Such advice risks leaving Congo and similarly situated
countries behind—something that the IEA, after all, had hoped to avoid.
The IEA reasons that “[n]onetheless, impacts are likely to be lower than
assessments of the cost of climate change damages.”89 While true, this
does not address how we should distribute the impacts of energy transition. Nor could it have done so in light of its modeling approach—such
questions were beyond the model’s reach.90
The plan also creates challenges for postindustrial economies like the
Europoean Union and the United States. From a climate perspective, the
IEA report sensibly discourages leisure and business flights.91 The EU
84. Compare IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 14, with Andreas Franke, EU To Lift
2030 Renewable Energy Share Target to 38-40% from 32%: Leaked Document, S&P GLOB.
(May 5, 2021), https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/electricpower/050521-eu-to-lift-2030-renewable-energy-share-target-to-38-40-from-32-leaked-document [https://perma.cc/LDK8-P362] (“EU wind energy capacity would need to be 433-452
GW by 2030 . . . .”), and Wind Energy in Europe 2020: Statistics and the Outlook for 20212025, WINDEUROPE (Feb. 25, 2021), https://windeurope.org/intelligence-platform/product/
wind-energy-in-europe-in-2020-trends-and-statistics [https://perma.cc/QUN5-UXL8] (“Europe installed 14.7 GW (10.5 GW in the EU-27) of new wind capacity in 2020.”). To reach
433 GW in a decade is slightly more than four times the 2020 number for the EU-27.
85. Compare EU Proposal, supra note 14, with IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 14
(“A major worldwide push to increase energy efficiency is an essential part of these efforts,
resulting in the annual rate of energy intensity improvements averaging 4% to 2030 . . . .”),
and Energy Intensity in Europe, EUR. ENV’T AGENCY (Feb. 9, 2021), https://
www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/total-primary-energy-intensity-4/assessment1 [https://perma.cc/3B6E-7H3L] (noting energy intensity improved in the EU at an average
of 1.7% per year from 1990 to 2017). Notably, the EU is not homogenous in its energy
intensity with new members having significantly higher energy intensity. EUR. ENV’T
AGENCY, EN17 TOTAL ENERGY INTENSITY 1–2, https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-andmaps/indicators/en17-total-energy-intensity/en17-total-energy-intensity [https://perma.cc/
Y9ZA-U86B].
86. IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 4.
87. Id. at 156.
88. Id. at 157.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 48–49.
91. Id. at 85.
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has recently proposed plans to implement this goal.92 Such policies would
likely lead to sizable hospitality worker layoffs and impact tourism-dependent regions like Central Florida or the Spanish Balearic Islands
(Mallorca).93 Energy transition policies will have to grapple with the job
losses of hospitality workers who would have the wrong skillset for a
post-energy transition economy.94
Just as problematically, increased growth in cyber economy and remote
work also faces limitations. Net zero policies like the IEA’s are premised
on reducing global electricity generating capacity by 7% between 2020
and 2030 in order to move fossil-fuel-burning power plants offline
quickly.95 The IEA projects that, in the long run, such a reduction in generating capacity can leave room for economic growth “because of a fall in
energy intensity (the amount of energy used to generate a unit of
GDP).”96 But the problem is one of timing as some “new” technologies
like Bitcoin and Zoom are comparatively energy intensive.97 Depending
on how energy transition policies are planned and implemented, an early
loss of generating capacity could topple the development of technologies
and industries needed to employ workers in traditional sectors like hospitality. Further, the policies could also undermine our efforts to adapt to
climate change itself.98
Where does this leave us? The IEA report proposes a radical approach
to reach net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. It does so for the
laudable purpose of combatting climate change. But the initial question is
incomplete. The report did not attempt to design the best energy transition policies, all things considered. It was asked the more technical economic modeling question of whether, in principle, a net zero 2050 plan
was even possible.99 As energy transition itself must be equitable and sustainable, we need to ask which policies are prudent rather than technically and economically feasible.
92. EU Proposal, supra note 14.
93. See Ryan Gillespie & Adelaide Chen, Central Florida Economy Stuck in Plateau as
Hotels Remain Mostly Empty, I-4 Traffic Stays Light, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug. 28, 2020,
11:51 AM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/coronavirus/os-ne-coronavirus-progress-orange-20200828-sj36lz4honglhox2udtnmdrpmy-story.html [https://perma.cc/V4FS-97QB];
Over 30% of Balearic Jobs Are in the Tourist Industry, MAJORCA DAILY BULL. (Oct. 31,
2015), https://www.majorcadailybulletin.com/news/local/2015/10/31/42146/over-balearicjobs-are-the-tourist-industry.html [https://perma.cc/FP4K-ZUVG].
94. See Walt Disney World Statistics, MAGIC GUIDES, https://magicguides.com/disneyworld-statistics [https://perma.cc/7HXA-NTNU] (listing costume designers and horticulturalists among the park’s 70,000 “Cast Members”).
95. See IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 56.
96. Id.
97. Carter, supra note 64; Peter Suciu, Do We Need To Worry That Zoom Calls Use
Too Much Energy?, FORBES (Apr. 16 2021, 11:57 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2021/04/16/do-we-need-to-worry-that-zoom-calls-use-too-much-energy/
?sh=5295883564c2 [https://perma.cc/33U5-K4WZ].
98. For example, “[r]emoving barriers to international trade in labor, capital, and
goods facilitates climate adaptation.” MATTHEW E. KAHN, ADAPTING TO CLIMATE
CHANGE: MARKETS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 223 (2021). But
this also imposes “brain drain” on smaller and developing nations. Id. at 228.
99. See IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 3.
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If implemented, the IEA’s approach poses risks. A historical analogy
may be helpful. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, economists
were asked to assist the newly freed states in devising policies to transition into free market economies.100 Some influential economists advocated for “shock therapy” to transform their economies as quickly as
possible.101 Shock therapy ran into two related problems. First, it brought
multiple economies to near collapse.102 Then, just as importantly, societies rejected shock therapy in favor of gradualist governments.103 Not
only that, the gradualist governments stepping into the vacuum allowed
authoritarian leaders to seize power.104 As good intentions go, these went
awry.
One might rightfully object that this critique of shock therapy relies on
anecdotal evidence—the fact that shock therapy did not work in some
instances should not mean that it could never work. Therefore, the criticism of energy transition shock therapy must go deeper.
A key problem with shock therapy is that its method risks imposing
severe and unmitigated losses, even if it is successful when judged by its
own terms. Historical failures of past shock therapies warn that losses can
exceed projections.105 But even successful shock therapy risks leaving significant losses where they fall. Therefore, shock therapy is problematic
even if we believe past mistakes can be avoided in the energy transition
context.
The reason for this problem is the IEA’s methodological approach. The
IEA’s approach to shock therapy seems to fall into the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency trap.106 The Kaldor-Hicks standard considers new policies to be
efficient (and acceptable) to the extent that it is theoretically possible to
100. For a contemporary report, see Peter Passell, Dr. Jeffrey Sachs, Shock Therapist,
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/27/magazine/dr-jeffreysachs-shock-therapist.html [https://perma.cc/3R58-B278].
101. Jeffrey Sachs, Shock Therapy in Poland: Perspectives of Five Years, THE TANNER
LECTURES ON HUM. VALUES 267, 267–68 (April 6 & 7, 1994), https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_resources/documents/a-to-z/s/sachs95.pdf [https://perma.cc/7H3U-5YN9].
102. See Barbara Crossette, A Focus on Those Displaced by the Fall of the Soviet Union,
N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/26/world/a-focus-on-thosedisplaced-by-the-fall-of-the-soviet-union.html [https://perma.cc/N3HB-53MX]. For a country study, see Enkhbayar Shagdar, Neo-Liberal “Shock Therapy” Policy During the
Mongolian Economic Transition, ECON. RSCH. INST. NORTHEAST ASIA 1, 1–2 (April 2007),
https://www.erina.or.jp/en/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/DP0703e.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5VFS-UEXN]. Mongolia suffered severe economic consequences even if it did not suffer
the kind of displacement from civil war that touched parts of the former Soviet Union. Id.
On the rise of President Lukashenka, see Anders Åslund, Europe’s Last Dictator: The Rise
and (Possible) Fall of Alyaksandr Lukashenka, ATL. COUNCIL (Aug. 9, 2020), https://
www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/europes-last-dictator-the-rise-and-possible-fallof-alexander-lukashenko [https://perma.cc/D6NQ-ENZ7].
103. John Marangos, Was Shock Therapy Consistent with Democracy?, 62 REV. SOC.
ECON. 221, 222 (2004).
104. See Åslund, supra note 102. For a broader discussion of economic shock therapy as
a particularly pernicious approach in other parts of the world such as Chile, see APPELBAUM, supra note 18, at 261–62.
105. See supra notes 101–104.
106. For a simple introduction to Kaldor-Hicks, see APPELBAUM, supra note 18, at 189.
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offset new policies’ losses by redistributing larger social gains to the
losers.107 As noted above,108 the IEA justifies the prospect of severe impacts from energy transition policies because “impacts are likely to be
lower than assessments of the cost of climate change damages.”109 Further, “the surge in private and government spending on clean energy
technologies . . . creates a large number of jobs and stimulates economic
output in the engineering, manufacturing[,] and construction industries[,
resulting] in annual GDP growth.”110 Incurring the losses would thus appear efficient—we are limiting losses and offsetting these limited losses
with greater gains elsewhere.
Centrally, the IEA’s approach also appears to endorse the second and
deeply controversial part of the Kaldor-Hicks standard. This standard
does “not care whether everybody was left unharmed” and instead considers it “sufficient . . . that everybody could be left unharmed.”111 The
IEA approach simply notes that structural reforms will be necessary “to
address the societal challenges” caused by energy transition policies
themselves112 but leaves the problem unsolved. In other words, the IEA’s
approach to shock therapy does not internalize these structural reforms in
its policy design. Instead, it is satisfied that its approach will be a success
if such structural reforms remain possible in the future.113
Putting the full picture together, we can now see that even successful
shock therapy guided by a political economy approach is content to risk
breaking things first in the hope they might be fixed later. The approach
is keenly aware of and, in fact, projects serious developmental losses as a
result of the shock therapy it recommends.114 The political economy approach does not include a correction for these anticipated losses in its
definition of successful shock therapy. Assuming successful shock therapy
therefore guarantees severe losses without any mechanism to secure that
these losses will ever be corrected. As Binyamin Appelbaum notes, “[a]s
with so much in economics, it ignores the question of distribution. It is a
theory to gladden the hearts of winners; it is less clear that losers will be
comforted” by the trade-offs they receive.115
This is not to say that we should not undertake reforms when doing so
is urgent. Rather, the key lesson from shock therapy is that top-down
expert advice has limited success when experts counsel radical change.116
As the IEA report acknowledges, “[t]he wholescale transformation of the
107. For a more nuanced discussion, see David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Inequality Rediscovered, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 61, 82 (2017).
108. Supra note 89 and accompanying text.
109. IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 157.
110. Id. at 156.
111. APPELBAUM, supra note 18, at 189.
112. IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 157.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. APPELBAUM, supra note 18, at 189.
116. See William Boyd, The Poverty of Theory: Public Problems, Instrument Choice,
and the Climate Emergency, 46 COLUM. J. ENV’T. L. 399, 472 (2021).
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energy sector demonstrated in the [net zero pathway] cannot be achieved
without the active and willing participation of citizens.”117 Such social acceptance, in turn, requires significant early engagement with affected
communities on a local and global level.118 This engagement must embed
plans for an equitable distribution of the relative environmental, economic, social, and cultural burdens in energy transition policies and
projects.119 On the global level, any such distribution must not leave behind entire states or societies.120 On the local level, it must secure a fair
and sustainable path for all members of society to advance.121 On the
project level, it must protect the rights of the communities that abut project sites from pollution and provide them with a say regarding project
design and implementation.122 Policymakers and energy stakeholders
must be mindful that energy transition is not just about achieving net zero
emissions but about an energy infrastructure that supports equitable and
sustainable development across world society.123 The IEA report highlights areas of concern to achieve an equitable energy transition.124 But it
does not answer how transition policies should be formulated to fulfill
this larger energy transition (nor was the IEA tasked with answering this
question).125
For the remainder of this Article, I will argue that lawyers have a critical role to play in formulating equitable and sustainable energy transition
policies. Lawyers are uniquely positioned to help in such a task because
the law habitually balances incommensurable rights.126 The many competing policy demands for energy transition precisely mean that prudent
decision-making should look to the law to manage the decision-making
process and avoid unanticipated consequences that place the entire energy transition enterprise in jeopardy. As I will argue in the remainder of
this Article, there is a legal concept that can answer this problem. That
concept is due diligence. I argue that the current focus on net zero driving
the IEA-2050 Report should be expanded: we need to map a diligent zero
pathway anchored in legal decision-making processes. It is only such a
diligent zero pathway that can meet the ambition of securing a just transi117. IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 67.
118. See GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 244 (2010).
119. See id.
120. See Frédéric Gilles Sourgens, A Parisian Consensus, 60 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
657, passim (2022) [hereinafter Sourgens Consensus].
121. See id.
122. See AENDERSON, WEAVER, DZIENKOWSKI, LOWE, HALL & SOURGENS, supra note
33, at 693–96.
123. See Sourgens Consensus, supra note 120, at 666.
124. See IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 156–57 (noting the policy challenges for oil
and gas producing states).
125. See id. at 3 (setting out the charge for the report).
126. See PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT
92–93 (1997).
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tion to net zero agreed to in the Glasgow Climate Pact.127
III. THE ENERGY DUE DILIGENCE FRAMEWORK
Diligence is part and parcel of care.128 Care, in turn, is a question of
judgment.129 Such judgment is at the heart of responsible decision-making.130 The minimum standards of responsible decision-making—judgment and care—are not just concerns of prudent business administration
or sound public policy.131 Diligence is a legal concept imposing obligations on private and public decision-makers alike.132 Unsurprisingly, due
diligence is a central part of legal regimes’ governance of energy
transition.
First, due diligence is a requirement of environmental law.133 It has
also become an essential element of the global climate regime.134 Both
are central to policymaking, including federal policymaking pursuant to
NEPA.135
Second, due diligence is a central component of international human
rights obligations. Such diligence obligations are frequently associated
with so-called second- and third-generation human rights—positive rights
such as the “right to water.”136 But states also have diligence obligations
127. Convention on Climate Change, Glasgow Climate Pact, ¶¶ 17, 20, 52, published
Nov. 13, 2021, (advance unedited version), https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/
cop26_auv_2f_cover_decision.pdf.
128. See Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 17; Tamar Meshel, Swimming Against the Current:
Revisiting the Principles of International Water Law in the Resolution of Fresh Water Disputes, 61 HARV. INT’L L.J. 136, 163–64 (2020).
129. See Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 17 (discussing business judgment).
130. See generally Cristie Ford, New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: Lessons
from Financial Regulation, WIS. L. REV. 101, 142 (2010) (discussing new banking governance premised on designing for reliability); Anne Peters, Heike Krieger & Leonhard Kreuzer, Due Diligence: The Risky Risk Management Tool in International Law, 9 CAMBRIDGE
INT’L L.J. 121, 122 (2020) (defining due diligence as the opposite of negligence).
131. Sir Andrew Likierman, The Elements of Good Judgment, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Jan.–Feb. 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/01/the-elements-of-good-judgment [https://perma.cc/
3PJR-AE6W]; Kevan W. Lamm, Nekeisha L. Randall, Alexa J. Lamm & Hannah S.
Carter, Policy Leadership: A Theory-Based Model, 2019 J. LEADERSHIP EDUC. 185–86
(2019); Peters, Krieger & Kreuzer, supra note 130, at 122–23.
132. See Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 17; Danny Cullenward, The Limits of Administrative Law as Regulatory Oversight in Linked Carbon Markets, 33 UCLA J. ENV’T. L. &
POL’Y 1, 7 (2015) (“administrative law places the burden of due diligence on agencies.”).
133. See Michael Burger, Jessica Wentz & Radley Horton, The Law and Science of
Climate Change Attribution, 45 COLUM. J. ENV’T. L. 57, 145–46 (2020); see also Robert V.
Percival, The EPA as a Catalyst for the Development of Global Environmental Law, 70
CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1151, 1190 (2020) (discussing how EPA practices have attained a
global reach through training programs); SANDS & PEEL, supra note 21, at 211–13.
134. BODANSKY, BRUNNÉE & RAJAMANI, supra note 21, at 41–48; Jutta Brunnée, International Environmental Law and Climate Change: Reflections on Structural Challenges in a
“Kaleidoscopic” World, 33 GEO. ENV’T. L. REV. 113, 120–22 (2020).
135. Exec. Order, supra note 45, §1.
136. “[T]raditional categorization of three generations of human rights . . . traces the
chronological evolution of human rights as an echo to the cry of the French revolution:
Liberté (freedoms, ‘civil and political’ or ‘first generation’ rights), Egalité (equality, ‘socioeconomic’ or ‘second generation’ rights), and Fraternité (solidarity, ‘collective’ or ‘third
generation’ rights).” Frans Viljoen, International Human Rights: A Short History, UNITED
NATIONS CHRON. https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/international-human-rights-law-
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in the context of so-called first-generation human rights—negative rights
such as the right not to be deprived of life or liberty without due process
of law.137 The EU is currently moving to require companies to conduct
human rights related assessments as part of legal corporate compliance
regimes.138
Finally, due diligence is a central component of environmental, social,
and corporate governance (ESG) in the business context.139 Such governance programs internalize environmental and human rights performance
as a measure of success in investment decisions.140 Then, these investment decisions are measured against ESG benchmarks.141 Due diligence
is a central part of companies’ ESG programs, for example, in the transportation and energy industries.142 These diligence standards internalize
diligent judgment even when that judgment may not be required by specific legislation.143 This form of governance relies heavily on self-regulation to implement environmental and human rights values in corporate
decision-making.144
The key difficulty is that energy transition requires states and energy
companies to conduct holistic diligence as opposed to disjointed or fragmented diligence.145 As we will see, the various diligence regimes informshort-history [https://perma.cc/8KW4-6NBX]. See also Rebecca Bates, Realizing the Right
to Water Within Environmental Limits, 23 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 17, 22 (2019) (“[T]he
recognition of the right to water provides a platform for aspirational and legal advocacy to
address water stress and poverty at both international and domestic levels.”).
137. See Viljoen, supra note 136; John H. Knox, Horizontal Human Rights Law, 102
AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 23 (2008).
138. See Resolution on Corporate Due Diligence and Corporate Accountability, EUR.
PARL. DOC. PV(22) (2021), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-20210073_EN.html [https://perma.cc/9AW4-FGKY]. For a discussion, see Dionysia Katelouzou
& Peer Zumbansen, The Transnationalization of Corporate Governance; Law, Institutional
Arrangements, & Corporate Power, 38 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 52 (2021); Jonathan
Bonnitcha & Robert McCorquodale, The Concept of ‘Due Diligence’ in the UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 899, 906 (2017).
139. Amy K. Lehr, Fiduciary Duties for a Globalized World: Stakeholder Theory
Reconceived, 27 GEO. MASON L. REV. 81, 138 (2019).
140. See Robert G. Eccles & Svetlana Klimenko, The Investor Revolution, HARV. BUS.
REV. (May–June 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/05/the-investor-revolution [https://perma.cc/
442P-Q8EZ] (discussing investment decisions through an ESG lens).
141. Suzanne Kröner-Rosmalen, ESG: The Transition to ESG Benchmarks and New
ESG Disclosure Requirements, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=BB885ae3-cbd6-444a-a919-372c35b76601 [https://perma.cc/2YXN59V9] (discussing EU ESG benchmarking efforts).
142. DAIMLER, BRIEF OVERVIEW—SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 25 (2020), https://www.
daimler.com/documents/investors/presentations/daimler-ir-briefoverviewsustainabilityreport2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DDF-LYMC]; Slavery and Human Trafficking Statement,
OIL & GAS CLIMATE INITIATIVE (2021), https://www.ogci.com/modern-slavery-policy
[https://perma.cc/UF88-YBQW].
143. See Lehr, supra note 139, at 138.
144. Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk, 73 VAND. L.
REV. 1401, 1439 (2020) (discussing ESG in the tech sector and noting, “In contrast with
Facebook’s casual apathy on privacy, ESG proposes voluntary self-regulation, developed
through ongoing engagement with stakeholders, including regulators and other government authorities”).
145. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 185 (2012) (noting the importance of holistic, multi-
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ing energy transition point in facially inconsistent directions—care for
human rights, environmental protection, and corporate governance,
among others.146 If decisions must satisfy each diligence obligation independently, it may well be that regulators and businesses simply cannot
make any decisions; what is diligent in one regime is not acceptable in
another.147
The New York Times recently reported on such a dilemma for U.S.
offshore wind development, which runs headlong into the Jones Act.148
“The Jones Act’s primary purpose is to regulate trade, meaning the transport of goods or people between two points in the United States.”149 The
problem is that
[t]he United States currently does not have a vessel that can construct turbines in transitional and deep waters, nor does the United
States have a ship that can both transport the materials and perform
the construction. There are foreign ships with these capabilities, but
U.S. cabotage laws prevent these ships from taking domestic supplies
from a U.S. port to a construction site in U.S. waters.150
As the New York Times notes, “[t]he United States could push through
more projects if it was willing to repeal the Jones Act’s protections for
domestic shipbuilding, for example, but that would undercut the president’s employment promises.”151 Even the most basic diligence by an energy company wishing to expand offshore wind will uncover this Jones
Act problem. Short of incurring the significant expense of building or obtaining a U.S. vessel capable of transport and construction, climate action
through this avenue is not possible.152 So how should the United States
respond to comply with its international climate obligations? Legitimate
policy imperatives point in inconsistent directions and thus lead to inaction.153 We will run into such Jones Act-style problems again in the next
section.
Inaction is unacceptable. The climate threat is too urgent to ignore.154
But this urgency cannot push other legal regimes to the side and claim the
method assessment to avoid unintended consequences); Lin, supra note 22, at 56 (highlighting the need for qualitative rather than exclusively quantitative decision-making).
146. On this inconsistency, see Sourgens Consensus, supra note 120, at 659–62.
147. For a discussion about this problem, see Frédéric Gilles Sourgens, The Precaution
Presumption, 31 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1277, 1278–79 (2020) [hereinafter Sourgens Precaution
Presumption]. This problem is not fully addressed in holistic climate diligence because that
approach assumes complementarity rather than tension between human rights, climate,
and environmental law outcomes. Macchi, supra note 26, at 108–09.
148. Ivan Penn, Offshore Wind Farms Show What Biden’s Climate Plan Is Up Against,
N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/07/business/energy-environ
ment/offshore-wind-biden-climate-change.html?action=click&module=top%20Stories&pg
type=homepage [https://perma.cc/52B3-HHRR].
149. Nicolas Martino, Offshore Wind Energy: Sophisticated Technology Struggling with
Outdated Legislation, 58 JURIMETRICS 59, 75 (2017).
150. Id. at 76 (internal citation omitted).
151. Penn, supra note 148.
152. See id.
153. See, e.g., id.
154. See IPCC 1.5°C, supra note 1, at 32–33, 79.
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wholesale supremacy of climate concerns over other legally relevant standards.155 We need to identify a different way of making judgment calls
and balance diverging rights against each other in decision-making.
Therefore, energy transition diligence only works if the different diligence streams can be combined into a single decision-making matrix.156
I will argue in this Part that this is doable. As a start, each of these
diligence regimes conceive of diligence in fundamentally the same way.
Due diligence in each of these settings refers to an obligation of conduct
and not an obligation of result.157 That is to say, due diligence is a question of how decisions are made.158 It is not a question of what decisions
are made.159 As I will discuss in the next section, this means that we can
arrive at fundamentally different and inconsistent results diligently. Not
everyone needs to reach the same conclusion. But diligence means that
everybody has to approach decision-making in a similar way.
We can usefully break this diligence framework into three steps: (1)
there must be an investigation on the basis of which a decision-maker can
project potential outcomes from a proposed policy, investment, or venture;160 (2) these projections then reveal risks that must be addressed
through planning by means of a risk mitigation plan;161 (3) such planning
must also have built in, data-based monitoring to assess the performance
of the policy, investment, or venture and adapt it as needed—mere planning is not enough.162 Diligence in the energy transition context must
combine different regimes into a single diligence decision-making framework. As I will argue, it must assess and reconcile climate risks with environmental and human rights risks.
Importantly, this approach means that there is significant room for policy disagreement and experimentation as energy transition gets underway. As different energy transition approaches mature, there should be a
convergence as they generate data. These data points will become inte155. See Diane Desierto, Calibrating Human Rights and Necessity in a Global Public
Health Emergency: Revive the UN OHCHR’s ICESCR Compliance Criteria, EJIL: TALK!
(Mar. 26, 2020) [hereinafter Desierto Human Rights], https://www.ejiltalk.org/calibratinghuman-rights-and-necessity-in-a-global-public-health-emergency-revive-the-un-ohchrsicescr-compliance-criteria [https://perma.cc/MCR2-Z3YQ].
156. See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449
F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
157. Knox, supra note 137, at 23; Alan Boyle, Introductory Remarks, 105 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 423, 424 (2011); Vladyslav Lanovoy, The Use of Force by Non-State Actors
and the Limits of Attribution of Conduct, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 563, 565 (2017). There is some
disagreement whether due diligence should not be characterized as an obligation of result.
See Elisa Ruozzi, The Obligation To Undertake an Environmental Assessment in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ: A Principle in Search of Autonomy, 8 EUR. J. RISK REGUL. 158,
164–65 (2017). This suggestion does go against the weight of authority. See Craig Martin,
Atmospheric Intervention? The Climate Change Crisis and the Jus Ad Bellum Regime, 45
COLUM. J. ENV’T. L. 331, 357 (2020).
158. Lanovoy, supra note 157, at 565.
159. Id.
160. See infra Section III.A.
161. See infra Section III.B.
162. See infra Section III.C.
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gral to the assessment of the relative success of different programs. These
assessments themselves feed back into diligent energy transition management in the third step of diligence. Diligence is not just a means to exercise judgment. It is also how other stakeholders in energy transition
communicate about the exercise of judgment and strengthen energy transition partnerships from the bottom up as energy transition is ongoing
instead of requiring ex ante global agreement on the best transition
pathway.
This approach also implies a trade-off. Diligence takes time. And diligence obligations invite litigation over whether diligence was conducted
properly or at all.163 Now, as time is of the essence, it would be odd to
introduce a focus on diligence obligations that could further slow progress. As we will see in the Parts that follow, this is a valid concern. Yet,
as we will also see, it is a challenge that is more likely to arise if we look
at diligence as a checklist item only—something to put behind ourselves
as quickly as possible. In those instances, we will see that diligence gives
rise to significant delays. However, this is not the case to the extent that
diligence is conducted in a truly communicative manner that involves
stakeholders as true partners from the earliest point onward. This communicative aspect of diligence is the key principle that can secure its success and the speedy implementation of energy transition policies more
broadly.
A. DILIGENT INVESTIGATIONS & RISK ASSESSMENT
Diligence must collect data and project risks.164 Holistic diligence must
do so across different traditional diligence regimes.165 This Section outlines that holistic energy transition diligence must begin with diligence
classically associated with energy transition planning—a risk assessment
of climate change and available technology. Holistic diligence also must
provide a risk analysis of the environmental and human rights impacts of
energy transition policies and projects. Finally, holistic diligence must assess the environmental and human rights risks of the supply chains supporting energy systems. The second and third steps, in particular, will
require early, transparent, and meaningful engagement of local communities to collect appropriate data and anticipate risks that will determine the
practical viability of energy transition policies.
First, energy transition diligence must rely upon and internalize climate
163. See Melody Schreiber, How One Inuit Community Won Against Big Oil, NEW RE(Oct. 9, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/151559/one-inuit-community-wonbig-oil [https://perma.cc/Z6RV-PCE4] (detailing a legal battle between Native Inuits and
the Canadian government over rights to Arctic waters).
164. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); Balt. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983); Corfu Channel (U.K. v.
Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 20 (Apr. 9).
165. See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980)
(noting different legitimate concerns alongside environmental impact for administrative
action).
PUBLIC

438

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

research to assess the climate impact of global energy systems.166 The
work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) provides an authoritative factual basis and forward-looking risk assessments
for such diligence efforts.167 Just as intuitively, energy transition diligence
also must investigate and assess risks related to the global energy systems.168 We need to know what current energy systems look like and
what their economic impact is.169 Finally, to guide energy transition, we
need to understand what alternative energy systems are available to replace greenhouse-gas-intensive generating capacity.170
Second, as we discussed in the previous Part, energy systems have significant knock-on effects on everything we do.171 The risks of transitioning to different energy systems are relevant to charting an appropriate
energy policy. To conduct this diligence, we will need a baseline. This
baseline looks to the human rights impact and environmental impact of
existing energy systems and of energy transition policies, projects, and
investments. Such investigations must gather information on, and project
future human rights impacts of, climate change itself.172 Again, the IPCC
has done significant research in this regard.173
Energy transition policies and projects themselves will have a humanrights impact. At a minimum, oil producing states such as Congo will be
deprived of the resources to provide basic services to their populations.174
This deprivation negatively affects the realization of the economic, social,
and cultural rights of those populations.175 Similarly, energy transition
policies may affect the economic capabilities of industrializing states and
thus negatively affect the realization of rights by people in those states, as
well.176 Finally, some groups within industrial and postindustrial societies
are also more vulnerable to climate policies.177
166. See IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 30–46.
167. IPCC 1.5°C, supra note 1, at 4.
168. See IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 37–40, 64–84.
169. See id. at 37–40, 155–59.
170. See id. at 64–80.
171. For an insightful case study on the impacts of Russian energy value chains on different economies, see MARGARITA M. BALMACEDA, RUSSIAN ENERGY CHAINS: THE REMAKING OF TECHNOPOLITICS FROM SIBERIA TO UKRAINE TO THE EUROPEAN UNION
(2021). Balmaceda follows the raw materials for Russian fossil fuel value chain from source
to consumer through the entire value chain (refining, transport, sale, use, etc.). Id. passim.
It is this Article’s proposition that such a study is essential also in the context of renewables
and in the context of comparing renewables to fossil fuels and nuclear energy.
172. Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, Joint Statement of the United
Nations Special Procedures Mandate Holders on the Occasion of the 24th Conference of
the Parties to the UNFCCC (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23982&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/CV9Q-CDBE]. For further discussion, see Kristin Casper, Climate Justice: Holding Governments and Business
Accountable for the Climate Crisis, 113 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 197, 198 (2019).
173. See IPCC 1.5°C, supra note 1, at 445–509.
174. See Congo-NDC, supra note 5, at 3.
175. See id.
176. Sourgens Consensus, supra note 120, at 17–18.
177. See, e.g., Josh Saul, Lower-Paying Labor Awaits Oil and Gas Crews in the Green
Energy Transition, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.worldoil.com/news/2021/3/4/
lower-paying-labor-awaits-oil-and-gas-crews-in-the-green-energy-transition [ https://
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These impairments are nontrivial. Human rights centrally include the
right to development.178 This right to development is crucially linked to
the right to electricity—the right to energy179—and it includes the right to
a livable environment.180 Energy is a central part of economic development on both ends.181 To limit access to electricity and energy, or to impair the right to health and life, is deeply problematic.182 So is the
stranding of entire societies whose economies were built around existing
energy systems.183 These impacts have to be measured to the extent possible to construct a reasonably accurate model of the consequences of
energy transition policies.
Energy transition policies and projects will ultimately have an environmental impact. These impacts include the risk to wildlife from renewable
energy installations: wind farms and solar arrays.184 They also include the
environmental risk from nuclear power plants as well as modular nuclear
plants.185 Finally, they include the environmental impacts of carbon capture and other forms of geoengineering such as solar radiation management.186 Policymakers have a diligence obligation to take action to
prevent transboundary harm.187 Policymakers and energy companies also
have such an obligation domestically.188 These impacts and risks will need
perma.cc/DFS9-GHGB] (discussing energy workers); Mathilde Martin & Mine Islar, The
‘End of The World’ vs. The ‘End of The Month’: Understanding Social Resistance to Sustainability Transition Agendas, A Lesson from the Yellow Vests in France, 16 SUSTAINABILITY SCI. 601, 601 (2021) (discussing farmers).
178. Bachelet, supra note 37.
179. See Lars Löfquist, Is There a Universal Human Right to Electricity?, 24 INT’L J.
HUM. RTS. 711, 711 (2020); Stephen R. Tully, The Contribution of Human Rights to Universal Energy Access, 4 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 518, 518–31 (2006).
180. HR 20 december 2019, NJ 2020, 41 m.nt. J. Spier (De Staat der Nederlanden/
Stichting Urgenda) (Neth.) [hereinafter Urgenda].
181. For a full discussion, see Sourgens Consensus, supra note 120, passim.
182. For the problem of energy justice, see Kirsten Jenkins, Darren McCauley, Raphael
Heffron, Hannes Stephan & Robert Rehner, Energy Justice: A Conceptual Review, 11 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI. 174, 175 (2016).
183. See id. at 176.
184. See Daniel Oberhaus, Why Do Solar Farms Kill Birds? Call in the AI Bird
Watcher, WIRED (Aug. 10, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/why-do-solarfarms-kill-birds-call-in-the-ai-bird-watcher/?redirectURL HT tps%3A%2F%2Fwww.wired.com%2Fstory%2Fwhy-do-solar-farms-kill-birdscall-in-the-ai-bird-watcher%2F [https://perma.cc/3PAK-NVRV]; John Copeland Nagle,
Green Harms of Green Projects, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 59, 62, 66
(2013) (discussing wind and solar energy posing biodiversity threats).
185. See Daniel Michaels, Mini Nuclear Reactors Offer Promise Of Cheaper, Clean
Power, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mini-nuclear-reactors-offer-promise-of-cheaper-clean-power-11613055608 [https://perma.cc/EWK5-MNKF] (discussing modular nuclear technology); Katherine Trisolini, Holistic Climate Change
Governance: Towards Mitigation and Adaptation Synthesis, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 615, 677
(2014) (discussing nuclear regulation).
186. See Eli Kintisch, Technologies, in CLIMATE ENGINEERING AND THE LAW: REGULATION AND LIABILITY FOR SOLAR RADIATION MANAGEMENT AND CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL 28–56 (Michael B. Gerrard & Tracy Hester eds., 2018).
187. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Urug.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, 55–56
(Apr. 20); see also SANDS & PEEL, supra note 21, at 211–13.
188. See Elizabeth Burleson, Cooperative Federalism and Hydraulic Fracturing: A
Human Right to A Clean Environment, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 309 (2012)

440

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

to be measured and projected to gain a holistic understanding of the risks
of different policy pathways.
Third, to understand the full impact of energy transition policies, we
need to conduct additional diligence into the environmental and human
rights impacts of energy transition supply chains. Different energy systems have different supply chains, and each of these supply chains has a
unique environmental risk profile.189 Robust reliance on renewable energy and electric vehicles, in particular, will require an “almost sevenfold
increase between 2020 and 2030” for “critical minerals like copper, cobalt, manganese[,] and various rare earth metals.”190 International mining
companies regularly conduct such diligence either as a matter of law or
due to lender concerns.191 Leading mining companies have adopted ESG
programs that require them to follow best international practices in conducting such an assessment.192 These data and risk projections should be
included in holistic diligence. One risk that such diligence will likely uncover is that environmental risks may make projects cost prohibitive.193
Even if mining companies can appropriately address environmental risks,
programs to do so may delay commercial operation of those projects beyond net zero supply chain assumptions.194
(discussing lawsuits against the U.S. federal government seeking injunctive relief for the
EPA to conduct an environmental impact assessment of hydraulic fracturing); see also
Jonathan Skinner-Thompson, Administrative Law’s Extraordinary Cases, 30 DUKE ENV’T.
L. & POL’Y F. 293, 310–14 (2020) (discussing separation of powers in the context of climate
impacts under the existing federal environmental statutory framework); Albert C. Lin,
Mismatched Regulation: Genetically Modified Mosquitoes and the Coordinated Framework
for Biotechnology, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205, 223 (2017) (“NEPA does not require that
agencies perform an ecological risk assessment.”).
189. Kintisch, supra note 186, at 23, 179.
190. FREEPORT-MCMORAN, 2020 CLIMATE REPORT 30 (2020), https://fcx.com/sites/fcx/
files/documents/sustainability/2020-Climate-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/H59Q-JZJH].
191. See Fabiana Li, Documenting Accountability: Environmental Impact Assessment in
a Peruvian Mining Project, 32 POLAR 218, 222 (2009) (discussing the global codification of
EIA requirements following the 1992 Earth Summit); INT’L FIN. CORP., IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 5–16 (Jan. 1, 2012),
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/c02c2e86-e6cd-4b55-95a2-b3395d204279/IFC_Performance_Standards.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=CKTjHBzk [ https://perma.cc/TGV9Y6AA] (setting out “Performance Standard 1: Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts”). For a discussion of the performance standard, see
Kristi Disney Bruckner, Community Development Agreements in Mining Projects, 44
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 413, 418–19 (2016).
192. See, e.g., RIO TINTO, STRATEGIC REPORT 2020 16 (Feb. 22, 2021) [hereinafter
STRATEGIC REPORT 2020], https://www.riotinto.com/-/media/Content/Documents/Invest/
Reports/Annual-reports/RT-annual-report-strategic-2020.pdf?rev=78cc987412034fc38b0ec
27361c1007e [https://perma.cc/7RXW-KL59].
193. For a discussion of an economy lacking capabilities to effectively police environmental hazards from cobalt production, see Lena Mucha, Karly Domb Sadof & Todd C.
Frankel, The Hidden Costs of Cobalt Mining, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-sight/wp/2018/02/28/the-cost-of-cobalt [https://perma.cc/
SSJ8-W3JV].
194. For one such example of delay, see Sergio Goncalves, Portugal’s Lithium Auction
Could be Postponed to Early 2022—Ministry, REUTERS (May 13, 2021), https://
www.reuters.com/article/portugal-lithium-auction/portugals-lithium-auction-could-be-postponed-to-early-2022-ministry-idUSL8N2N0250 [https://perma.cc/FC32-XJWY]. On lithium
supply chain issues, see Joshua S. Hill, EVs May Face Production Delays from 2027 as
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Diligence must also investigate the potential supply chain impacts on
human rights and project future human rights risks. Production supply
chains for solar panels reportedly rely upon forced labor.195 The IEA2050 Report briefly notes potential human rights impact with regard to
mining supply chains for renewable energy.196 Legislation increasingly requires companies to investigate such supply chain risks as part of corporate decision-making.197 Many companies already conduct such diligence
as part of their ESG programs.198 Policymakers must build similar diligence programs to assess global human rights impacts in policymaking.199
These risks and impacts again must be measured to support diligent decision-making.
Broader energy transition diligence is necessary to avoid significant
Jones Act problems. As it stands, there are significant corporate diligence
requirements in place regarding the global and domestic human rights
and environmental impact of energy projects as well as their supply
chains.200 Compliance with these diligence requirements itself can materially impact the timetables of policy implementation. Noncompliance with
these diligence requirements would also materially impact energy
projects. Consequently, both project and policy design must anticipate
these problems to meet their ultimate goal—equitable, sustainable, and
efficacious energy transition.
Newmont Mining’s Conga copper-gold project in Peru is a helpful example of this dynamic.201 Copper is one of the minerals needed for enLithium Mining Lags, DRIVEN (Apr. 16, 2021), https://thedriven.io/2021/04/16/evs-mayface-production-delays-from-2027-as-lithium-mining-lags [https://perma.cc/5PXS-NUSG].
For the IEA’s assumptions, see IEA-2050, supra note 7, at 14, 44 (“Electric vehicles (EVs)
go from around 5% of global car sales to more than 60% by 2030.”).
195. See Swanson & Buckley, supra note 4.
196. See IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 179.
197. See Kirsti Knolle, Germany Passes Law on Tougher Oversight of Supply Chains,
REUTERS (June 11, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-companies-supplychains/germany-passes-law-on-tougher-oversight-of-supply-chains-idUSKCN2DN1AV
[https://perma.cc/NT8W-ZQQH]. For an English summary of the law, see Germany:
Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON (Apr. 30, 2021), https://
www.debevoise.com/insights/publications/2021/04/germany-mandatory-human-rights-duediligence [https://perma.cc/A77T-SC83]. For an initial analysis of the law, see Jaclyn Jaeger,
German Supply Chain Draft Legislation Expected To Have Far-Reaching Effect, COMPLIANCE WEEK (May 18, 2021), https://www.complianceweek.com/supply-chain/german-supply-chain-draft-legislation-expected-to-have-far-reaching-effect/30391.article [https://
perma.cc/SA53-PAKV].
198. See Human Rights, BHP, https://www.bhp.com/sustainability/community/humanrights [https://perma.cc/8TY9-SBTA].
199. See generally MONNHEIMER, supra note 39, at 278 (discussing extra-territorial licensing due diligence obligations). This diligence is arguably broader than required in U.S.
environmental law. NEPA-Guidance, supra note 45, at 14. Given the ESG concerns, it is
however important to consider these developments as a matter of project feasibility.
200. See MONNHEIMER, supra note 39.
201. Newmont Board Approves Conga Project in Peru and Tanami Shaft Project in Australia, NEWMONT (July 27, 2011) [hereinafter Newmont-Approval], https://
www.newmont.com/investors/news-release/news-details/2011/Newmont-Board-ApprovesConga-Project-in-Peru-and-Tanami-Shaft-Project-in-Australia/default.aspx [https://
perma.cc/KF99-S3TF].
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ergy transition.202 Newmont originally projected that “commercial
operations [would] commence in late 2014 to early 2015.”203 The project
has faced persistent complaints that it impairs fundamental human rights
of indigenous peoples.204 Resistance to the project reads like a movie
script; one headline reads: “Peru governor to seek re-election, fight gold
project from prison.”205 Litigation over land rights regarding the project
reached the Peruvian Supreme Court and the Court ruled against the
project.206 The project currently lays dormant and is unlikely to enter
commercial operations for at least another four years.207 This is not a
lone example. The Jadar lithium project in Serbia faced significant local
community opposition.208 The Serbian government—though it supports
the project—is mulling whether to submit final approval for the project to
a referendum.209
Delays in copper and lithium production impact supply chains that are
already tight.210 As the IEA notes, mining output will have to grow by
700% to meet demand in the next ten years to implement its proposals.211
Any significant delays in bringing mines online will impact the entire energy transition process.212 COVID-19-related supply chain disruptions illustrate how supply shortages of raw materials radiate up the supply
chain.213 Construction projects today are delayed and significantly more
expensive due to a shortage of basic commodities such as lumber.214 We
202. See IEA-2050, supra note 7, at 23.
203. Newmont-Approval, supra note 201.
204. See COLUM. L. SCH. HUM. RIGHTS CLINIC, CONGA NO VA: AN ASSESSMENT OF
THE CONGA MINING PROJECT IN LIGHT OF WORLD BANK STANDARDS 1, 14 (Sept. 2015)
[hereinafter CONGA NO VA], https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/
human-rights-institute/conganova_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/243W-23CB].
205. Peru Governor To Seek Re-Election, Fight Gold Project from Prison, REUTERS
(June 30, 2014, 3:07 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-peru-newmont-santos/perugovernor-to-seek-re-election-fight-gold-project-from-prison-idUKKBN0F52EO20140630
[https://perma.cc/A83D-PC3G]. See also Report: Newmont Mining’s Conga Project Could
Be Delayed Another 4 Years, MINING (May 17, 2020) [hereinafter Newmont Delay], https://
miningglobal.com/smart-mining/report-newmont-minings-conga-project-could-be-delayedanother-4-years [https://perma.cc/RGC4-5RVQ]; Paul Harris, Castillo Maintains Hardline
Mining Rhetoric, MINING J. (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.mining-journal.com/copper-news/
news/1408594/castillo-maintains-hardline-mining-rhetoric [https://perma.cc/FJ62-UG66].
206. Peru Supreme Court Rules Against Newmont in Dispute Over Gold Mine,
REUTERS (May 3, 2017, 2:51 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/peru-mining-newmont/
peru-supreme-court-rules-against-newmont-in-dispute-over-gold-mine-idUSL1N1I51GN
[https://perma.cc/9ETZ-2TND].
207. See Newmont Delay, supra note 205.
208. See Radomir Ralev, Serbia May Call Referendum on Rio Tinto’s Jadar Lithium
Project—Vucic, SEENEWS (June 8, 2021, 13:21) [hereinafter Serbia Referendum], https://
seenews.com/news/serbia-may-call-referendum-on-rio-tintos-jadar-lithium-project-vucic743785 [https://perma.cc/PB68-LLGN].
209. See id.
210. See IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 23.
211. Id.
212. See id.
213. See Sean Harapko, How COVID-19 Impacted Supply Chains and What Comes
Next, ERNST & YOUNG (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.ey.com/en_us/supply-chain/how-covid19-impacted-supply-chains-and-what-comes-next [https://perma.cc/63SD-KXV9].
214. See Frank Morris, Lumber Prices Are Staying Sky High—Even if the Pandemic
Ends Soon, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 30, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/03/30/982805743/
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can expect the same mechanism to affect energy transition projects if we
do not diligently streamline energy transition supply chains. The inclusion
of environmental and human rights diligence with regard to both energy
transition projects and supply chains will go a long way to support this
goal.
This begs the question: how do we conduct such energy transition policy and supply chain diligence? The first step of such diligence is meaningful community engagement.215 The Conga and Jadar projects provide
some helpful data points. The International Finance Corporation (IFC)
originally backed the Conga project.216 Therefore, it had to comply with
IFC performance standards.217 These standards require facially robust
diligence.218 The Jadar project, in turn, is operated by Rio Tinto.219 Rio
Tinto has a strong ESG program.220 This program requires significant diligence.221 Despite such robust diligence, both the Conga and Jadar
projects were met with sizable community resistance.222 Both contexts
suggest that project stakeholders (including, notably, the governments of
Peru and Serbia) did not engage sufficiently with local communities in
understanding what impacts to measure and prevent. Even following
global due diligence best practices runs into difficulty when projects cannot garner community support through meaningful early engagement.
A successful example of community engagement provides some further
context. This example involves a Chevron-operated project in the Niger
lumber-prices-are-staying-sky-high-even-if-the-pandemic-ends-soon [https://perma.cc/
M3GU-M9PM].
215. See Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicar. v.
Costa Rica), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. 665, 706-7 (Dec. 16) (discussing the state-to-state context); Mara Tignino & Christian Bréthaut, The Role of International Case Law in Implementing the Obligation Not to Cause Significant Harm, 20 INT’L ENV’T. AGREEMENT 631,
646–47 (2020) (discussing nascent obligation of community consultation in international
environmental law); Office of the U.N. High Commissioner, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy”
Framework, at ¶¶ 17, 29, U.N. Doc. HR/Pub/11/04 (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Y3C-HB8Y]; see
also NEPA-Guidance, supra note 45, at 24–25 (highlighting the importance of early vulnerable community engagement).
216. See Conga, YANACOCHA (June 2013), http://www.yanacocha.com/wp-content/
uploads/2014/04/Conga-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/68WD-TAGH].
217. See COMPLIANCE ADVISOR OMBUDSMAN, COMPLIANCE APPRAISAL: SUMMARY OF
RESULTS, (Oct. 22, 2018) https://www.cao-ombudsman.org/sites/default/files/downloads/
CAOComplianceAppraisalYanacocha11_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/ND6Y-B27D].
218. See Mark Wielga, Human Rights Impact Assessment, in TEACHING BUSINESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK 8–11 (2016).
219. See Projects, RIO TINTO, https://www.riotinto.com/en/operations/projects [https://
perma.cc/SK5R-NHU6].
220. See Company ESG Risk Ratings: Rio Tinto Ltd., SUSTAINALYTICS, https://
www.sustainalytics.com/esg-rating/rio-tinto-ltd/1008740749 [https://perma.cc/T4DWNHUP] (rating Rio Tinto’s management of ESG issues as “strong”); see also Betty Moy
Huber & Michael Comstock, ESG Reports and Ratings: What They Are, Why They Matter,
HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOV. (July 27, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/27/
esg-reports-and-ratings-what-they-are-why-they-matter [https://perma.cc/9DDE-P6KZ]
(listing Sustainalytics as leading ESG ratings provider).
221. See STRATEGIC REPORT 2020, supra note 192, at 87.
222. See Newmont Delay, supra note 205, at 5; Serbia Referendum, supra note 208.
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Delta.223 After an initial failure to garner community support, Chevron
adopted a different strategy.224 It engaged Professor Femi Ajibola and his
local nongovernmental organization (NGO), New Nigeria Foundation, as
a broker.225 Professor Ajibola and the New Nigeria Foundation had deep
local community ties to assist in community engagement.226 At the same
time, it provided the broker with meaningful resources to create local
governance capacities to monitor project implementation.227 It also provided means to these local governance mechanisms to support programs
deemed essential by community deliberation.228 The project thus supported local autonomy and capacity and became an integral part of local
community development.229
Professor Ajibola later explained the difference between Chevron’s
earlier failed approach and the successful one he took: the earlier approach “was just appeasing community leaders . . . . But, they didn’t listen.”230 Professor Ajibola explained that “[t]here are many companies
that are well-intentioned but they don’t understand the process of development.”231 Such companies, he elaborated, spend money on schools,
hospitals, and other infrastructure they believe to be important.232 Professor Ajibola concluded with an insight worth repeating in full in the
current context:
The unfortunate thing is that, number one, you cannot sit down and
decide the needs and requirements of others for them. Number two,
you cannot prioritize for them. Number three, even if you get it
right—that is, you are able to identify what they need—it is extremely important that they own the process and that they own the
structures in place for their development.233
Both the problematic projects—Conga and Jadar—and Professor
Ajibola’s successful approach in the Niger Delta suggest that early community engagement is central to ultimate success. This early engagement
requires trusted go-betweens in the affected community and policy- and
223. See AENDERSON, WEAVER, DZIENKOWSKI, LOWE, HALL & SOURGENS, supra note
33, at 689–91.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. WITOLD J. HENISZ, CORPORATE DIPLOMACY: BUILDING REPUTATIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS 98 (Taylor & Finance Group ed., 2017).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. Further, it is not clear that every community would wish to follow a similar
developmental path. Thant Myint-U made such a point in the context of Burma/Myanmar.
THANT MYINT-U, THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF BURMA, RACE, CAPITALISM, AND THE CRISIS
OF DEMOCRACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 202–03 (2020). Further, the very notion of imposing standards—however softly and well-intentioned—has a tendency to backfire. This dynamic was powerfully explored in the Eastern European context by Ivan Krastev and
Stephen Holmes. See IVAN KRASTEV & STEPHEN HOLMES, THE LIGHT THAT FAILED:
WHY THE WEST IS LOSING THE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY 74 (2019).
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decision-makers. This engagement must assist in capacity building in affected communities to allow the community to identify impacts and risks
to be measured in diligence. When these impacts and risks are identified
meaningfully, the communities can deal with them. As the Conga and
Jadar projects show, such impacts are not always obvious to outsiders.
Successful diligence is not just a matter of global policy support for project companies and developing countries.234 It depends on crucial community engagement and capacity building that actively listens to affected
communities.235
The second part of conducting successful due diligence investigations is
to focus on more than a single policy path. As a common-sense matter, to
do otherwise is to fall prey to the law of the hammer: if you hold only a
hammer, everything starts looking like a nail.236 This can cause us to ask
the wrong questions about what we should do, particularly when facing
complex decisions.237 To avoid this danger, diligent, or prudent, judgment
compares multiple scenarios and makes a decision only after understanding how they differ from each other.238 Prudent judgment requires data to
make such comparisons logically. Due diligence, therefore, must collect
this data to support discerning judgment.
The law, in fact, confirms this prudential insight.239 Human rights obli234. See generally IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 23.
235. See POPE FRANCIS, supra note 47, at ¶ 51. It is not enough to seek passive consent
from affected communities whose raw materials are used higher up in energy value chains.
Professor Adom Getachew powerfully explores how such regimes of weak consent following externally imposed value structures are deeply enmeshed in the colonial and post-colonial experience in Africa. See ADAM GETACHEW, WORLDMAKING AFTER EMPIRE 42
(2019). Particularly, Professor Getachew notes that President Wilson’s project of the
League of Nations used autonomy as a double-edged sword because, “if consent suggested
anything like democratic decision-making, Wilson and Smuts argued that racially backward
people were not suited for democracy but could partake in minimal forms of consent and
were owed some modicum of respect.” Id. Following Wilson’s view leads to an unequal
integration of those societies into world society. See id. at 32. In Professor Getachew’s
analysis, this lack of true respect for people in the Global South continues to affect contemporary global power relationships as “contemporary economic globalization should be
situated within a long history of an imperial global economy.” Id. Taking seriously the
autonomy of people and peoples in resource producing states in the Global South means
engaging with these communities on an equal footing and placing significant decisional
authority in their hands. Any path that assumes that international institutions such as like
the World Bank, Western think tanks, or global conglomerates know better than the people living in the communities at issue is not only arrogantly elitist; it is also tinged with the
very same history of racism that Professor Getachew identifies. See id. This means power
dynamics must be remade so that local communities are given their due and treated as full
equals participating in an equitable manner in the resource and energy value chains they
help to build.
236. See ABRAHAM KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY: METHODOLOGY OF
BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCE 28 (2017).
237. See Valentina Azarova, Adjudicators, Guardians, and Enforcers: Taking the Role
of Non-Governmental Organisations in Customary International Lawmaking Seriously, in
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS, NON-STATE ACTORS, AND THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 404–36 (Sufyan Droubi & Jean d’Aspremont eds., 2018).
238. See David R. Mapel, Prudence and the Plurality of Value in International Ethics, 52
J. POL. 433, 447–49 (1990).
239. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii); NEPAGuidance, supra note 45, at 9.
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gations require states, for example, to move progressively towards full
realization of economic, social, and cultural rights.240 States must conduct
diligence to meet this end.241 And they must require companies to include this goal in their own ESG due diligence.242 Diligence must compare different available avenues to achieve the progressive realization of
human rights. While different paths are open, they are only open to the
extent that they are diligently pursued.243 The same is true in climate
law.244 There, states must establish that, for example, new power plants
support the highest achievable climate ambition.245 This highest ambition
and progressive realization to secure human rights or secure climate
change mitigation must rely upon a comparison to be meaningful.246
Of course, diligence does not need to consider every policy available.
Such a requirement would bring judgment to a complete stop. But diligence exercises must be reasonable.247 We will discuss reasonableness in
more detail in Part III, but intuitively, decision-makers should at least
consider several plausible alternatives so they can justify their ultimate
choices.248 The IEA report identifies several of these possible alternatives
(even as it elects to pursue a different path that relies on them less):
greater investment in nuclear power,249 greater investment in hydrogen
as against electrification of transportation,250 greater emphasis on carbon
removal (again, a technology given a subsidiary role in the IEA report),251 or an assessment of more drastic forms of geo-engineering.252
Diligent policymakers should consider some of these pathways in making
policy judgments. This means that for each, policymakers must collect the
kind of data discussed in this section. Once sufficient data to make risk
projections is in hand, a holistic, forward-looking assessment is at least
possible.
B. RISK MITIGATION PLANNING
Collecting data is not enough. As we have seen in the last Section, part
of the problem is that any one policy or project could run into Jones Act
240. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2, ¶ 1(1),
Dec. 16, 1966, 1966 U.S.T. 521, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
241. See, e.g., MONNHEIMER, supra note 39, at 218.
242. See, e.g., DESIERTO PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 20, at 131.
243. See id. at 75.
244. See, e.g., BODANSKY, BRUNNÉE & RAJAMANI, supra note 21, at 41–47.
245. See id.; NEPA-Guidance, supra note 45, at 14–16.
246. Assume someone asked me to bring the “largest dog” and I show up with a Teacup
Chihuahua. The Teacup Chihuahua is the “largest dog” if it is the only dog, but it would be
absurd to bring one otherwise. See Sarah Holloway, Teacup Chihuahua—Pros and Cons of
Living with the World’s Tiniest Dog, THE HAPPY PUPPY SITE (Mar. 16, 2019), https://
thehappypuppysite.com/teacup-chihuahua [https://perma.cc/4DBB-KE6F].
247. See Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 195–96 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
248. See id.
249. IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 14.
250. See id. at 75–77, 108–11.
251. See id. at 79–81.
252. See Kintisch, supra note 186, at 31, 33–39.
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problems—that is, situations that place rather sizeable obstacles in the
way of effective energy transition.253 These problems could be environmental in nature, or they could be human rights problems.254 This Section
addresses the Jones Act problem head-on: how does diligence lead to this
problem, and how can diligence propose means to resolve that problem?
To answer these questions, we first need to look at what happens in due
diligence after data is collected and projections are made. Once we have
collected all of the data and made our projections about the climate, environmental, human rights, and economic impacts of a policy or project,
diligence requires us to formulate a plan to address these impacts.255 The
point of diligence is to eliminate, or at least mitigate, the negative impacts
identified in the investigatory phase.256
Diligence does not seek to eliminate impacts completely.257 Otherwise,
it would be an obligation of result rather than an obligation of conduct.
Rather, the point of diligence is to take reasonable steps to address
risks.258 We will discuss what this reasonableness means in detail in Part
IV, but at this point, we can already identify a key way in which diligence
treats reasonableness: the measures taken in response to identified negative impacts must be proportionate efforts to address the threat.259
In many instances, this proportionality analysis is reasonably intuitive.
Some impacts may be so negligible that we do not need to do anything at
all. Other impacts may suggest a comparatively inexpensive fix. For example, it is reported that painting wind turbine blades black could reduce
the rate of bird strikes by as much as 70%.260 Should this study be confirmed, it may not be unreasonable to expect wind farms to implement
this technology if endangered bird species are known to be in the area.
And some impacts will require rather significant technological upgrades
253. See id. at 31–34, 36–37, 40–41.
254. See supra Section III.A.
255. See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980);
Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on the Appropriate Use of Mitigation and Monitoring and Clarifying the Appropriate Use of Mitigated Findings of No Significant Impact, 76 Fed. Reg. 3843 (Jan. 21, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500,
1501, 1502, 1505, 1506, 1507, and 1508) [hereinafter NEPA-Monitoring]; LINDA S. SPEDDING, DUE DILIGENCE HANDBOOK: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT AND
BUSINESS PLANNING 203 (2009); Katelouzou & Zumbansen, supra note 138, at 52. See also
Indus Waters Kishenganga (Pak. v. India), Arbitral 11 R.I.A.A. 309, 354 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2013); Peters, Krieger & Kreuzer, supra note 130, at 125–26; Tamar Meshel & Moin A.
Yahya, International Water Law and Fresh Water Dispute Resolution: A Cosean Perspective, 92 UNIV. COLO. L. REV. 509, 546–47 (2021).
256. See Meshel & Yahya, supra note 255, at 548–49, 554–55.
257. See Peters, Krieger & Kreuzer, supra note 130, at 126.
258. See, e.g., id. at 129; El Paso Field Servs., L.P. v. MasTec N. Am., Inc., 389 S.W.3d
802, 808–09 (Tex. 2012).
259. See, e.g., NEPA-Guidance, supra note 45, at 11–12; Diego Venegas, Compliance
Programs and Ethics Issues, in MINING AGREEMENTS: CONTRACTING FOR GOODS AND
SERVICES 14-11 (2015). See also Marco Longobardo, The Relevance of the Concept of Due
Diligence for International Humanitarian Law, 37 WIS. INT’L L.J. 44, 47–53 (2019) (discussing diligence in international law).
260. Mark Kinver, Black Turbine Blade ‘Can Cut Bird Deaths,’ BBC (Aug. 26, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-53909825 [https://perma.cc/AN2V-KV62].
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because of the severity of the threat they pose. For example, the reduction of methane emissions from oil and gas operations is a comparatively
more involved process.261
Importantly, sometimes risks that seem negligible do materialize, leading to actual adverse consequences. But this does not make the original
judgment any less diligent.262 That is, we cannot look at diligence efforts
with hindsight bias.263
The Texas electrical grid provides a good example.264 Texas energy
companies and regulators deemed the risk of weeklong freezes in the
state too low given past weather patterns to justify the expense of winterizing gas facilities.265 Similarly, in the wind sector, “winterization packages add about 5% to the cost of a turbine, and the power draw reduces
the turbine’s output.”266 Problematically, “[i]n Texas, where wind goes
toe-to-toe with rival technologies on the basis of power pricing, any added cost is a killer.”267 Consequently, neither gas-fired power plants nor
wind power plants purchased or installed cold weather packages when
new power plants were first built.268 Or, as leading Texas energy lawyer
Becky Diffen put it, this reflected “a prioritization of cheap power over
building for the worst case scenario.”269 Providing this cheap power was
an express policy goal—and one that is on the whole beneficial.270
But a prolonged deep freeze did in fact engulf Texas in 2021.271 And
261. See OIL & GAS CLIMATE INITIATIVE, SCALING UP ACTION: AIMING FOR NET
ZERO EMISSIONS 28–40 (Sept. 2019), https://48qdhih3uxxncvf45h3e296c-wpengine.netdnassl.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/OGCI-Annual-Report-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7XY4-35AJ].
262. See Longobardo, supra note 259, at 47–50, 54.
263. See G.M. LAWRENCE, EXETER CONSULTING & ANALYTICS: A PACIFIC FINANCIAL
COMPANY, WHITE PAPER: PERCEPTUAL BIASES IN THE ASSESSMENT OF “REASONABLENESS” IN DUE DILIGENCE AND RELIANCE 3 (Oct. 2017), https://exeterltd.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/10/White-Paper-Perceptual-Biases-in-the-Assessment-of-Reasonableness.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8LHU-6DY2].
264. Grid Information, ERCOT, http://www.ercot.com/gridinfo [https://perma.cc/
RFG3-VR8C].
265. See BLACK & VEATCH, LONG-TERM ASSESSMENT OF NATURAL GAS INFRASTRUCTURE TO SERVE ELECTRIC GENERATION NEEDS WITHIN ERCOT: APPENDIX A, 4 (2013),
http://www.ercot.com/content/committees/other/lts/keydocs/2013/
BV_ERCOT_Gas_Study_Appendix_A.pdf [https://perma.cc/AL3G-8ACC].
266. Jim Krane, Robert Idel & Peter Volkmar, Winterization and the Texas Blackout:
Fail to Prepare? Prepare to Fail, FORBES (Feb. 19, 2021, 10:55 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/thebakersinstitute/2021/02/19/winterization-and-the-texas-blackoutfail-to-prepare-prepare-to-fail/?sh=687445347c83 [https://perma.cc/ES25-H7LS].
267. Id.
268. See id.
269. Becky Diffen, Why Texas Can’t Handle Freezing Weather for a Week, LINKEDIN
(Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/why-texas-cant-handle-freezing-weatherweek-becky-diffen/?trk=Public_profile_article_view [https://perma.cc/38FH-3Y34].
270. See Ken Silverstein, Deregulation Is Not the Central Culprit for Texas’ Electricity
Crisis, FORBES (Mar. 1, 2021, 8:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2021/
03/01/deregulation-is-not-the-central-culprit-for-texas-electricity-crisis/?sh=2596fb5c2cf7
[https://perma.cc/LV2L-QHQB].
271. Neelam Bohra, Almost 70% of ERCOT Customers Lost Power During Winter
Storms, Study Finds, TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 29, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/
2021/03/29/texas-power-outage-ERCOT [https://perma.cc/W7J9-2J6T].
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due to the decisions made by power companies and regulators, it had
devasting effects on Texas residents.272 The Texas grid came close to collapsing.273 Understandably, commentators soon criticized Texas power
companies and their regulators.274
Nevertheless, our diligence metric suggests that we need to be careful
in placing blame. A result (near grid collapse) does not prove a lack of
diligence.275 We need to ask whether Texas power companies and regulators acted proportionately to known risk data.276 Damningly, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) warned Texas power companies
and regulators about cold weather risks after a milder freeze in 2011.277
At the same time, the policy and project decisions were very much informed by data projections and policy preferences for cheaper energy at
most times in exchange for a potential loss of generating capacity in extreme (and rare) scenarios.278 It should therefore take a significant failure
of judgment to conclude that conduct was not diligent.
The understandable temptation to lay blame can help us understand
how Jones Act problems materialize. Consider what might have happened if Texas had heeded the 2011 warning to winterize new power
plants appropriately.279 Much of the wind power in Texas was installed
after that 2011 warning.280 Had that warning been implemented, wind
power would have been more expensive to install due to regulatory burdens to winterize. These costs might not have been imposed on direct
competitors, i.e., existing power plants.281 The road not taken could also
have wiped out the progress Texas’s energy policies actually achieved:

272. See id.
273. See Matt Largey, Texas’ Power Grid Was 4 Minutes and 37 Seconds Away from
Collapsing. Here’s How It Happened, HOUS. PUB. MEDIA (Feb. 24, 2021, 5:18 AM), https://
www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/energy-environment/2021/02/24/392290/texaspower-grid-was-4-minutes-and-37-seconds-away-from-collapsing-heres-how-it-happened
[https://perma.cc/DNM8-3STQ].
274. See, e.g., Silverstein, supra note 270; Bohra, supra note 271.
275. See Boyle, supra note 157, at 424 (asserting governments “will not be responsible
for damage if they have acted with due diligence”).
276. See Venegas, supra note 259, at 14-11.
277. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION AND THE NORTH AMERICAN RELIABILITY CORPORATION, REPORT ON OUTAGES AND CURTAILMENTS DURING THE SOUTHWEST COLD WEATHER EVENT OF FEBRUARY 1-5, 2011 204 (2011) [hereinafter FERC/
NERC Staff Report], https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/08-16-11-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8LTG-DZRQ] (recommending that new plants “be able to perform at the
lowest recorded ambient temperature for the nearest city for which historical weather data
is available”).
278. See id. at 214.
279. See id.
280. See Fred Mayes & Elesia Fasching, Wind Is a Growing Part of the Electricity Mix in
Texas, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=45476 [https://perma.cc/S32L-AYUK].
281. See Krane, Idel & Volkmar, supra note 266. For an instructive discussion of policy
implications of grandfathering in the environmental policy context, see Bruce R. Huber,
Transition Policy in Environmental Law, 35 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 92–93, 96–99 (2011).
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Texas is currently a leading state for installed wind generating capacity.282
We run into Jones Act problems because energy systems are highly
complex. Adjusting any one regulation to meet laudable policy goals such
as increasing cold weather resilience has systemic effects on what kind of
future developments are feasible.283 This complexity, in turn, has potential effects on what energy transition achievements are possible in the
new regulatory environment.284 And that, again, informs the realization
of human rights and development outcomes that are possible in the context of existing energy infrastructure.285 Diligence that seeks to address
single issue problems (say, winterization of power infrastructure to adapt
to the effects of climate change) is highly likely to have significant impacts beyond that issue. It must be broadened to take these broader impacts into account.
The same mechanism was at work in our original Jones Act problem.
The installation of offshore wind turbines in the United States ran into
the Jones Act requirements that regulate the transport and use for installation of U.S. vessels.286 Complying with the Jones Act requires U.S. entities to build or purchase their own ships.287 This is not economically
feasible at this point and, in any event, would take significant time. Consequently, offshore wind projects are not moving at the pace needed to
support U.S. energy transition efforts on the eastern seaboard.288 This
dilemma leaves the eastern seaboard with some difficult policy choices in
its energy transition.
The answer to this problem can only be that we must prepare our risk
mitigation plans holistically rather than piecemeal. As we have seen, the
Jones Act problem is likely to materialize when we assess proportionality
against only one goal or value—our actions may not ultimately be proportional when problems are later viewed as a whole. The United States’
cabotage laws set a high bar for transport and construction of energy infrastructure in U.S. waters to protect the national maritime sector.289
Cold weather resilience in power infrastructure is a similarly central goal
for reliable energy access as climate change worsens.290 But here, legiti282. See Abigail Anderson & Richard Bowers, Texas Ranks First in U.S.-Installed Wind
Capacity and Number of Turbines, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 31, 2019), https://
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=40252 [https://perma.cc/E8U3-FP6D].
283. Compare FERC/NERC Staff Report, supra note 277, § 11, 203–04 (proposing
standards for greenfield developments) with Krane, Idel & Volkmar, supra note 266 (outlining price competition).
284. See Mayes & Fasching, supra note 280.
285. See Irina Ivanova, Texas Winter Storm Costs Could Top $200 Billion—More than
Hurricanes Harvey and Ike, CBS NEWS (Feb. 25, 2021, 3:59 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/
news/texas-winter-storm-uri-costs [https://perma.cc/8Y4W-PUBL]; Soma Biswas, Brazos
Urges Texas Governor to Veto Winter Storm Finance Legislation, WALL ST. J. (June 11,
2021, 7:09 PM), [https://perma.cc/DFC9-86M4] https://www.wsj.com/articles/brazos-urgestexas-governor-to-veto-winter-storm-finance-legislation-11623452943.
286. Penn, supra note 148.
287. See Martino, supra note 149, at 75.
288. See Penn, supra note 148.
289. See Martino, supra note 149, at 75.
290. See Krane, Idel & Volkmar, supra note 266.

2022]

Diligent Zero

451

mate concerns can result in a de facto veto of policies central to energy
transition.291 Obviously, that was never the intent of the Jones Act—energy transition was not even on the horizon when it was passed.292 Likewise, it is unlikely to have been FERC’s intent in 2011.293
Due diligence again needs to collect and produce data to address Jones
Act problems holistically. As discussed in the last Section, such holistic
diligence must involve affected communities as active participants in their
own fate and identify which impacts and risks matter.294 With these stakeholders as part of the decision-making process, we will need to collect
sufficient data to project the systemic consequences of existing regimes
and propose new regulations for energy transition. Energy companies already do so for proposed projects when they conduct legal and ESG due
diligence.295 Similarly, policymakers will need to account for effects
across energy systems when implementing new regulations that affect energy transition as part of their respective diligence obligations.296 Finally,
both energy companies and policymakers will need to account for the
global supply chain repercussions of such projects and policies, as codification efforts of supply chain diligence obligations such as those currently
ongoing in Germany outline.297 And they will need to account for the
potential transboundary harm such projects and policies might produce in
their own right.298
If due diligence is done well, it should identify when the measures required by existing or proposed rules are not technologically or economically feasible. In such scenarios, due diligence must collect data to explain
why that technology is in fact not available or could not be developed in a
timely manner. For instance, consider wind turbines and the threat they
pose to migratory birds protected by the Endangered Species Act and the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act; it is not possible to design wind turbines that
pose no threat to birds.299 Alternatively, diligence must establish that the
cost of adopting required measures would not allow energy or mining
291. See Penn, supra note 148.
292. See Constantine G. Papavizas, The Story of the Jones Act (Merchant Marine Act,
1920): Part I, 44 TUL. MAR. L.J. 460–64 (2020) (providing historical context).
293. See FERC/NERC Staff Report, supra note 277, at 203–04 (drawing no distinction
between types of power plants).
294. See, e.g., HENISZ, supra note 230, at 123–24.
295. See Prajakt Samant & Simone Goligorsky, Due Diligence for Energy and Commodity Asset Acquisitions, REED SMITH (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2017/01/due-diligence-for-energy-and-commodity-asset-acqui [https://perma.cc/
Z3YV-PQ3M]; Jonathan Axelrad, Edgar Romo, Dino Barajas, Vanessa Wilson & Craig M.
Tighe, The Impact of ESG Metrics on M&A Transactions in the Energy Sector, in ASSESSING ESG FACTORS IN THE ENERGY SECTOR: A HANDBOOK 8 (2020), https://
www.dlapiper.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2020/10/enr-esg-handbook_v9lm.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6ZMR-GU79].
296. See Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also
supra Section III.A.
297. See sources cited supra note 197.
298. See Tilmann Altwicker, Transnationalizing Rights: International Human Rights
Law in Cross-Border Contexts, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 581, 586, 588–89, 594, 597 (2018).
299. On administrative guidance regarding such threats, see Wildlife Concerns Associated with Wind Energy Development, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. [hereinafter USFWS],
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companies to achieve a reasonable rate of return on their investment
(meaning that core projects would not be pursued).300 Further, it would
need to establish that governments are not, in fact, capable of bridging
the gap in question. For example, as of today, there is no fully reliable
certification scheme to guarantee environmentally responsible and
human-rights compliant cobalt sourcing.301
Armed with this data, diligence can logically establish which policies
and project structures are technologically possible or economically feasible (e.g., permitting a reasonable return on investment). And it can establish what the consequences of implementing the project with such
available safeguards would be. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, for
instance, has implemented such a scheme to support wind projects by requiring permits for turbines that even incidentally take or harm migratory
birds and tracking impacts on protected bird species.302 To the extent that
certain technology is not available at all, the negative projected impact of
the project or policy would simply materialize at full scale. What is more
likely is the slight reduction of the impact with available technology. In
the migratory bird context, we saw that recent initial studies suggest
painting blades black may significantly decrease bird strikes.303 With this
data in hand, we can project what alternative energy transition pathways
are available and what risks and costs each entails. Specifically, we can
project the respective specific, unmitigated global climate, environmental,
and human rights risks each of these pathways continues to pose. This
means diligence now puts us in a position to compare the relative merits
of each plausible pathway forward.
In principle, each of the different pathways this diligence effort suggests should offer Pareto-optimal strategies. “Pareto optimality” is an economics-based argument concerning the fairness of different allocations
of resources.304 As Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen puts it,
Pareto optimality describes “a situation in which the utility (or welfare)
of no one can be raised without reducing the utility (or welfare) of someone else.”305 This function has been used to discuss intergenerational equity in the climate change context—thus, “[a]n intergenerational
distribution A is Pareto-superior to intergenerational distribution B if, in
distribution A, one generation is better off and the other is not worse off,
https://www.fws.gov/midwest/wind/wildlifeimpacts/index.html [https://perma.cc/44SAQ764].
300. See, e.g., Penn, supra note 148.
301. TRANSPORT & ENVIRONMENT, COBALT FROM CONGO: HOW TO SOURCE IT BETTER
6–7 (2019), https://www.transportenvironment.org/sites/te/files/publications/Cobalt%20from%20Congo_how%20to%20source%20it%20better_Final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Z4L2-4A6G].
302. USFWS, supra note 299.
303. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
304. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 117 (1999) [hereinafter SEN
DEVELOPMENT].
305. Id.
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compared to distribution B.”306 It “is Pareto-optimal if no other distribution is Pareto-superior to it.”307 There is always more than one such
Pareto-optimal distribution available.308 Any Pareto-superior distribution
realizes efficiency gains compared to a Pareto-inferior distribution. These
gains themselves can be distributed in any number of ways between A
and B.
Pareto’s argument is helpful because energy transition diligence tries to
measure welfare impacts according to different incommensurate metrics,
such as environmental impact, human rights impact, and climate impact.
To understand why the three impacts are incommensurate, consider the
following thought experiment: would killing all human beings help stop
climate change? That would certainly eliminate anthropogenic climate
impacts entirely, but it would violate the right to life.309 And is the impact
of renewable energy projects on endangered bird species relevant to climate change impact? Not really, but it matters to environmental law.310
Given that these three impacts are incommensurate, we can apply the
welfare function as a guide. We ask whether we can conceive of a policy
or project structure that would both be economically feasible and increase the realization of one of the three factors without also reducing the
realization of another. If the answer is no, we have reached a Paretooptimal solution even if the solution underperforms the requirements of
one of these factors viewed on its own. At a minimum, we know that a
champion of such a policy could credibly submit the policy as the “best
we can do” at the moment. That is, there is no better policy option available that gives to Paul but does not take from Peter. Of course, once we
reach that point, the policy discussion turns into a zero-sum game—any
gain we can make in one area will lead to losses in another.311 We would
trade environmental impact for climate or human rights impact or vice
versa. Once we have reached that point, we cannot devise a better way to
address our problems from a holistic perspective. We must choose one of
the Pareto-optimal options on the table.
The job of due diligence is to provide a reasonable number of such
Pareto-optimal alternatives and to determine the impact of not proceeding with the policy or project at all.312 As with the number of alternatives
due diligence needed to examine in Part II, due diligence does not need
306. Stephen Marks, Valuing the Future: Intergenerational Discounting, Its Problems,
and a Modest Proposal, 41 ENV’T L. REP. 10615, 10624 (2011) (emphasis omitted).
307. Id.
308. See id.
309. See IPCC 1.5°C, supra note 1 (discussing anthropogenic climate change); William
J. Aceves, Valuing Life: A Human Rights Perspective on the Calculus of Regulation, 36 L.
& INEQ. 1, 2 (2018) (“The right to life and the corollary right to be free from the arbitrary
deprivation of life constitute the defining human right.”).
310. See, e.g., USFWS, supra note 299.
311. See SEN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 304, at 117.
312. But see Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 53
DUKE L.J. 1067, 1088 (2003) (arguing that NEPA and similar statutes only require disclosure that policy options are not Pareto-optimal and leaving the issue to the political
process).
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to run through every conceivable scenario. But it should at least establish
scenarios that leave climate, environmental, and human rights outcomes
in a reasonable, Pareto-optimal equipoise (say we achieve 50% of what
we would have liked ideally on each scale) and scenarios that maximize
each of these outcomes and project the relative impairment this cause to
others. If we achieve 100% of our climate goal, what environmental and
human rights goals can we still meet? And what environmental and
human rights impacts can we reasonably project to occur in such a scenario? We will discuss in Parts IV and V what limits there are on choosing
one of the alternatives and how this choice must occur to be diligent. Yet,
as a preliminary matter, each of these Pareto-optimal alternatives is, in
most instances, a choice one might diligently make.
C. MONITORING, DISCLOSURE & ADAPTATION
Diligence is not finished once a policy or project is approved. We intuitively know that someone hardly shows good judgment if they ignore new
information. We may not fault a person’s judgment for getting on an outdoor ladder to do home repairs when the weather report predicts good
weather. We would seriously doubt their judgment if they stayed on the
ladder in a storm once the weather report had proved inaccurate. Intuitively, this means that diligence requires us to monitor what actually happens and adjust accordingly.313
The law bears out this intuitive assessment.314 Environmental law requires environmental impact monitoring.315 Similarly, climate law requires that states and non-state actors take stock of the greenhouse gases
they actually emit.316 This data is critical to gaining a detailed understanding of the human climate-change impact.317 States and companies are
gathering more detailed data as part of ongoing diligence efforts.318 Monitoring, in turn, requires transparent disclosure.319 The same diligence and
disclosure obligations apply in the human rights context.320
ESG regimes, in principle, require companies to monitor and disclose
outcomes to affected stakeholders. For example, oil and gas companies
monitor greenhouse gas emissions to audit their methane reduction commitments.321 Extractive industry companies use local participants to mon313. See SPEDDING, supra note 255, at 188–191.
314. See, e.g., Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, 18,
79 (Apr. 20).
315. See, e.g., SANDS & PEEL, supra note 21, at 657–81.
316. See, e.g., Paris Agreement art. 13(7)(a), adopted Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 161104 [hereinafter Paris Agreement]; NEPA-Monitoring, supra note 255.
317. Paris Agreement, supra note 316, art. 14.
318. See GHGRP Reported Data, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
ghgreporting/ghgrp-reported-data [https://perma.cc/4YJA-Q6BX] ; OIL & GAS CLIMATE
INITIATIVE, supra note 261, at 27.
319. See Paris Agreement, supra note 316, art. 13(7)(a) (requiring disclosure of climate
data).
320. See MONNHEIMER, supra note 39, at 233–36.
321. See OIL & GAS CLIMATE INITIATIVE, supra note 261, at 29–31.
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itor the success of community development agreements intended to
protect and promote human rights outcomes in the communities in which
these companies operate.322 Diligence thus means we must constantly
gather information, and this information in turn informs future decisionmaking.
That being said, broader public ESG disclosures remain a thorny issue.
Such disclosures are helpful for companies to signal their commitment to
sustainable development.323 They are also helpful for stakeholders to
measure ESG performance.324 At the same time, such disclosures pose
legal risks.325 Once disclosures are made, companies become more vulnerable to lawsuits asserting that disclosures were misleading or that the
company had knowledge other than what it disclosed. This legal risk has
led to an increase in disclosures that communicate comparatively little.326
More jurisdictions are considering making such disclosures mandatory.327
Similarly, standard-setting bodies are working on providing uniform metrics for disclosures that would limit the risk of potential litigation and
further encourage more disclosures.328 Yet, both movements are still
ongoing.329
States and companies must act on this data. International environmental law requires such adaptation as a matter of black letter law.330 By way
of the structure of the Paris Agreement, climate law similarly requires
such adaptation of policies.331 Finally, human rights law also requires that
states adjust their aim to the extent that disclosures indicate an underperformance of diligence.332 The same is true in the business-and322. See Evaristus Oshionobe, Community Development Agreements as Tools for Local
Participation in Natural Resource Projects in Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES: TRANSPARENCY, PARTICIPATION, RESISTANCE 77, 92 (Isabel Feichtner,
Markus Krajewski & Ricarda Roesch eds., 2019) (discussing the best practices of local
community participation in monitoring but noting that African CDAs do not follow this
practice).
323. Patrick Bolton & Marcin T. Kacperczyk, Signaling Through Carbon Disclosure,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 30, 2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu
/2021/03/30/signaling-through-carbon-disclosure [https://perma.cc/TL6J-8VQS].
324. See Hari M. Osofsky, Jacqueline Peel, Brett McDonnell & Anita Foerster, Energy
Re-Investment, 94 IND. L.J. 595, 622 (2019).
325. See David R. Woodcock, Amisha S. Kotte, & Jonathan D. Guynn, Managing Legal
Risks from ESG Disclosures, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 12, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/08/12/managing-legal-risks-from-esg-disclosures
[https://perma.cc/2BGY-4V8J].
326. See Brett McDonnell, Hari M. Osofsky, Jacqueline Peel & Anita Foerster, Green
Boardrooms?, 53 CONN. L. REV. 335, 364 (2021).
327. See HAROLD BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SEC. L. HANDBOOK § 3:76 (2021)
(discussing U.S. climate disclosure requirements); Natalie Nowiski, Rising Above the
Storm: Climate Risk Disclosure and Its Current and Future Relevance to the Energy Sector,
39 ENERGY L.J. 1, 20–21 (2018) (discussing European disclosure requirements).
328. See Virginia Harper Ho & Stephen Kim Park, ESG Disclosures in Comparative
Perspective: Optimizing Private Ordering in Public Reporting, 41 UNIV. PA. J. INT’L L. 249,
315–23 (2019).
329. See id. app. at 326 (summarizing the current ESG disclosure state-of-play).
330. See SANDS & PEEL, supra note 21, at 211–13.
331. Paris Agreement, supra note 316, arts. 4(3), 14(3).
332. See MONNHEIMER, supra note 39, at 233–36.
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human-rights setting.333
Such action does not require states and companies to fully realize their
original environmental impact or human rights impact goals. As noted
above, diligence is an obligation of conduct, not result.334 We must reasonably implement the measures outlined in a risk mitigation plan.335 If
the effort—the conduct—is appropriate, the failure to achieve results is
not immediately legally relevant.336
An obligation of conduct requires us to use reasonable efforts to adapt
to unanticipated circumstances.337 Such reasonable efforts must maintain
the original risk/reward equilibrium as far as reasonably possible.338 If it
is not possible to rebalance the risks and rewards, a policy or project may
well need to be abandoned as unsafe.339
This is not the end of the analysis. We need to account for the negative
impacts of abandoning the project or policy itself. Arguably, these impacts may be comparatively worse. One example is heating in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, the coldest capital in the world.340 Winter temperatures
drop below 20° Fahrenheit.341 Many of the city’s inhabitants live in traditional gers off the grid.342 They use stoves burning raw coal to keep
warm.343 The resulting air pollution is a significant health and environmental problem.344 Yet, telling people to endure –20° Fahrenheit without
heat seems more problematic.345 The Mongolian government took a different approach; it sought to displace raw coal with an alternative
semicoke fuel.346 It is unclear whether the policy will displace raw coal as
the alternative fuel is not ideal in its own right,347 but in a universe of
horrible choices, it is inevitable to do harm. Diligence requires us to try to
333. See Astrid Sanders, The Impact of the ‘Ruggie Framework’ and the ‘United Nations
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ on Transnational Human Rights Litigation, in THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE: MOVING FORWARD, LOOKING
BACK 288 (Jena Martin & Karen E. Bravo eds., 2015) (discussing obligations to mitigate
human rights impacts).
334. See id. at 294.
335. See PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN BOYLE & CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT 149–50 (3d ed. 2009).
336. See id. at 148–50.
337. See id. at 170.
338. See id. This is analogous to the duty of good faith renegotiating in the context of
materially changed circumstances. Duty to Renegotiate, TRANS-LEX, https://www.translex.org/935000 [https://perma.cc/QHA8-4GWA]. Such an approach would draw on the
principle of rebus sic stantibus.
339. See BIRNIE, BOYLE & REDGWELL, supra note 335, at 150, 170.
340. Emily Kwong, Mongolia’s Capital Banned Coal to Fix Its Pollution Problem. Will
It Work?, NPR, (July 30, 2019, 5:08 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/30/727688757/
mongolias-capital-banned-coal-to-fix-its-pollution-problem-will-it-work [https://perma.cc/
C76H-Q8L5].
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. See id.
346. See id.
347. See id.
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do the least harm—sometimes even unsafe policies and projects cannot
be abandoned.
In the context of energy transition, this problem gets worse. Available
risk mitigation options already underperform ideal outcomes.348 If policies or projects then underperform even their less-than-ideal goals, impacts are likely to be significant.349 And yet room for adjustment is
limited.350 This difficulty can only be overcome through active stakeholder engagement. Such engagement uses transparent disclosures as a
baseline for shared decision-making.351 Decisions, again, try to find a new
Pareto-optimal balance of achievable outcomes, which the new circumstances still permit.352
Without this engagement, energy transition policies risk failure. The
Texas winter storms highlight why Texans swiftly reacted to the near-failure of the power grid. As the Houston Chronicle reports, diesel-operated
backup generators now “fly off the shelves.”353 People do not trust their
energy providers or energy regulators—over 40% of respondents in a
February 2021 poll believed Texas utilities and Texas regulators were
“very responsible” for the Texas blackouts.354 Therefore, they engage in
self-help.355 This self-help further undermines collective climate efforts.356 Such self-help sets up a tragedy of the commons—an overuse of
shared resources threatens the sustainability of the resource base itself.357
To avoid these scenarios, affected people must be consulted early, have
348.
349.
350.
351.

See supra Section III.B.
Id.
Id.
See ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR MEANINGFUL STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT IN THE EXTRACTIVES SECTOR 56 (2015), https://
www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/OECD-Guidance-Extractives-Sector-Stakeholder-Engagement.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XYL-SE2E].
352. See id. at 52.
353. Paul Takahashi, As Generators Fly Off the Shelves After Winter Storm, Some Texans Opt to Build Their Own DIY Version, HOUS. CHRON. (June 13, 2021), https://
www.houstonchronicle.com/business/article/Home-generator-demand-along-with-ingenuity-16244832.php [https://perma.cc/C55R-XDCB]; Diesel Power Called Up to Aid Texas
Electrical. Power Crisis, Storm Recovery: GLOBENEWSWIRE (Feb. 18, 2021, 2:56 PM),
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2021/02/18/2178442/0/en/Diesel-PowerCalled-Up-to-Aid-Texas-Electric-Power-Crisis-Storm-Recovery.html [https://perma.cc/
A4MB-FAAQ].
354. Lisa Martine Jenkins, Following Mass Power Failures in Texas, Over Half of Voters
Say State Needs to Connect Its Grid to Others, MORNING CONSULT (Feb. 24, 2021, 6:00
AM), https://morningconsult.com/2021/02/24/texas-power-grid-independence-polling
[https://perma.cc/M6BC-SKNX]; Chloe Hall, Texas Power Outage Sparks Outrage, VAND.
POL. REV. (Mar. 14, 2021), https://vanderbiltpoliticalreview.com/10322/us/texas-power-outage-sparks-outrage [https://perma.cc/ZZS7-DLA8].
355. See Takahashi, supra note 353.
356. See MARIA BRUCOLI, KRISTIAN STEELE, CHRISTOPH HAMELMANN, ELLIMAN
JAGNE & DAISY MUKARAKATE, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, OFFGRID POWER SUPPLY CARBON FOOTPRINT AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY PLANNING OF PRIMARY HEALTH FACILITIES 2 (2015), https://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/HIVAIDS/Regional%20practices/UNDP%20Briefing_OffgridPower96.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V3K3-MLB9].
357. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 AM. ASS’N ADVANCEMENT
SCI. 1243, 1243–44 (1968).
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a stake in collective action,358 and trust collective decision-making.359
Building trust requires transparent, timely, and full communication.360
And it requires that affected persons accept the policy decisions made on
their behalf—they must believe that these decisions are in the interest of
the whole community.361
Due diligence in energy transition requires states and companies to design effective consultation and disclosure mechanisms.362 Diligence requires states and companies to conduct themselves reasonably—and
design reasonable processes to address plausible risks.363 The risk that
energy transition policies and projects underperform environmental and
human rights goals is certainly plausible; variables are many and their
interactions are complex.364 This heightens the risk of failure until more
information is known—and can be shared—about the impact of energy
transition policies.365 Any diligent plan must address this systemic risk.
This means we will need to improve public reporting and local stakeholder participation in due diligence monitoring. For communication to
work, states and companies must transparently report environmental, climate, and human rights performance data.366 And they must do so in a
way that makes these reports easy to compare and assess.367 Further, local participation in adaptation mechanisms, too, must increase.368 ESG
developments are encouraging. But as of yet, they are insufficient as disclosures and local participation in monitoring is not universal.369 Developments are headed in that direction.370 Policymakers can assist in this
development by creating disclosure safe harbors and thus reducing litigation risk as ESG disclosures, practices, and standards mature.371
Just as importantly, disclosures are instrumental to the success of future
energy transition policies and projects. The more data we collect, the
more risks become known.372 And the more performance data we have,
the better we can calibrate our response to developments on the ground
in new projects.373 Diligence therefore requires a doubling down on
358. See ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 263–64 (2005).
359. See id. at 97–98.
360. See id. at 85–88; Tignino & Bréthaut, supra note 215, at 645–46.
361. See REISMAN, supra note 145, at 138–41.
362. See NEPA-Monitoring, supra note 255.
363. See ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 351, at 44–45.
364. See Catherine Bale, Liz Varga & Timothy J. Foxon, Energy and Complexity: New
Ways Forward, 138 APPLIED ENERGY 150, 152 (2015).
365. See OSTROM, supra note 358, at 86–88.
366. See id.
367. See McDonnell, Osofsky, Peel & Foerster, supra note 326, at 364.
368. See Oshionobe, supra note 322 at 92 (analyzing best practices in local community
participation).
369. See id.; McDonnell, Osofsky, Peel & Foerster, supra note 326, at 364.
370. See, e.g., Ho & Park, supra note 328, at 315–23.
371. See Woodcock, Kotte & Guynn, supra note 325.
372. See Amro M. Elshurafa, Hind M. Farag & David A. Hobbs, Blind Spots in Energy
Transition Policy: Case Studies from Germany and USA, 5 ENERGY REPS. 20, 21 (2019).
373. U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Eur., Pathways to Sustainable Energy: Accelerating Energy Transition in the UNECE Region, at 3, ECE/ENERGY/131 (2020).
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transparent reporting obligations. And it requires robust standards and
independent audits of reports.
The law already supports such developments. Diligence is a flexible,
goal-oriented obligation of conduct.374 Knowing that a goal cannot be
efficiently achieved without a new process means we must adopt that process or run afoul of diligence obligations.375 Flexibility, in other words,
supports ambition. As we have seen, state and corporate practice support
this understanding of diligence: both are increasing reporting requirements and improving reporting standards. Holistic diligence-based governance, therefore, very much appears to work as intended.
IV. REASONABLENESS IN ENERGY TRANSITION
DILIGENCE
Our discussion so far has highlighted that diligence must be reasonable.376 Reasonableness, in turn, was typically a question of proportionality.377 Reasonableness and proportionality are flexible standards.378 This
flexibility is helpful. But it can also introduce the potential for arbitrariness in decision-making.
The problem is made worse by the fact that we are trying to establish
whether outcomes are proportionate to each other even though we cannot measure them on the same scale.379 Human rights, climate, and environmental impacts each measure something different.380 They each
respond to different values.381 So how does it make sense to put these
values in proportion to each other?
The first answer to this question is that diligence always occurs in a
specific factual context. I cannot be diligent in the abstract—there must
be something to investigate.382 The different human rights, climate, and
environmental perspectives help to organize how to make sense of concrete risks.383 They provide a map on which raw data points become intelligible information.384
Helpfully, this concrete context means that it is almost impossible to
find a policy that completely isolates human rights, environmental, or climate impacts. Different policy options will have impacts across the board
374.
375.
376.
377.

See generally BIRNIE, BOYLE & REDGWELL, supra note 335, at 148–49.
See generally id.
See supra Section III.A.
See NICOLAS DE SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES: FROM POLITICAL SLOGAN TO LEGAL RULES 97, 99–100 (2002).
378. See BIRNIE, BOYLE & REDGWELL, supra note 335, at 149.
379. See supra Section III.B.
380. See id.
381. See id.
382. See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14,
55–56 (Apr. 20).
383. See REISMAN, supra note 145, at 184–85 (“[N]one of the non-adjudicatory decision
functions can be discharged without some way of mapping the social process that enables
the international lawyer to take vast amounts of ‘data’ and to organize and interrelate
them in ways that render them useful ‘information.’”).
384. See id.
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just by virtue of the complexity of energy systems.385 For example, the
human rights lens is sensitive to climate and environmental impacts.386
We make use of our environment. Degrading that environment, therefore, is likely to have a panoply of human rights impacts.387 These impacts, of course, affect life and health.388 Air pollution in Ulaanbaatar,
for example, reaches deadly levels, particularly for children.389 But there
are cultural impacts, too: the sky has cultural significance for
Mongolia.390 Air pollution, therefore, is not just significant from a health
perspective but from a cultural perspective as well. Improving environmental and climate outcomes is therefore likely to register on human
rights scales.391
What is reasonable in this context is not a question of abstraction. It is
a question of comparing particular potential risks and outcomes to each
other. And these risk clusters can be compared to each other precisely
because they affect all three of our diligence outcomes at once—human
rights, environment, and climate. We can therefore compare different
paths in this conceptual topography even though each metric on its own is
incommensurable.392
Further, as we assess different policy alternatives, we ask five distinct
questions to assess the proportionality of the choices available to us. First,
we ask if what we propose is actually feasible. Unaffordable diligence
demands are more likely to be unreasonable and disproportionate, all
things being equal.393 The financial and technological capabilities of the
parties are a further consideration in this context.394 Tellingly, the requirement to produce detailed environmental impact assessments is triggered only to the extent that there is a cognizable risk of substantial
pollution, i.e., the cost of such assessments is seen as an impediment to
legitimate attempts by states to provide basic services to their
385. See Bale, Varga & Foxon, supra note 364, at 152.
386. See Urgenda, supra note 180.
387. See Michael Burger, Bi-Polar and Polycentric Approaches to Human Rights and
the Environment, 28 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 371, 374–84 (2003) (noting that “[t]he reinterpretation of existing rights to include environmental concerns is different from the mobilization strategy insofar as it defines environmental degradation itself as a human rights
violation. This process of reinterpretation essentially comprises lawyering through the international system to read environmental protections into established human rights that do
not explicitly provide for such protections” and articulating such arguments for and
against).
388. See, e.g., Urgenda, supra note 180.
389. See Kwong, supra note 340.
390. See id.
391. See G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 24(2)(c) (Nov. 20,
1989). For further discussion, see generally Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Right of the Child to
a Clean Environment, 23 S. ILL. UNIV. L.J. 611, 617, 647 (1999); see also ICESCR, supra
note 240, arts. 12(2)(b), 15(1)(a).
392. See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 242–43 (2009).
393. See BIRNIE, BOYLE & REDGWELL, supra note 335, at 148; NEPA-Guidance, supra
note 45, at 13.
394. See Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, 1996 Protocol, art. 2, 30 Aug. 1975, 1046 U.N.T.S. 138.
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populations.395
Second, we need to determine the relevant affected community engagement and support for proposed energy transition policies and
projects. World leaders like President Biden insist that energy transition
can be a driver of economic growth.396 The reason for this insistence is to
create broader buy-in for energy policies.397 Losing support is perilous
for successful energy transition, as the French yellow vest protests have
shown.398 Unsurprisingly, leading legal scholars insist that energy transition remains consistent with economic growth.399
Community engagement must look beyond economic growth as a heuristic for community support.400 Policies may create growth while negatively affecting the standard of living of a sizeable portion of community
members and vice versa (a large part of the community can actually be
increasingly better off despite flat economic growth).401 We must therefore look beyond mere growth. The impact of policies and projects will
differ from community to community because of the specific social, cultural, and economic context of each community.402 Even understanding
what impacts to measure and what risks might materialize requires an
engagement with affected communities.403 Anything short of early, transparent, and full engagement is significantly likely to obstruct policies or
projects before they have left the planning stage, as the Conga project,
for example, has shown.404 The exercise of judgment is only diligent, reasonable, or proportional to the extent it bears such community engagement and support in mind.
395. See SANDS & PEEL, supra note 21, at 662–74 (summarizing relevant provisions of
the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on Environmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context, and the Biodiversity Convention). Actions a state
must take are also means-tied in jurisprudence. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment,1949 I.C.J. 4, 22; Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, 241 (July 8).
396. See Coral Davenport, Noam Scheiber & Lisa Friedman, Biden’s Big Bet: Tackling
Climate Change Will Create Jobs, Not Kill Them, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/03/31/climate/biden-climate-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/2XS2MTZ8].
397. See Elaine Kamarck, The Challenging Politics of Climate Change, BROOKINGS
(Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-challenging-politics-of-climatechange [https://perma.cc/M87V-BY79] (discussing political challenges of energy transition
policies).
398. See generally Martin & Islar, supra note 177, at 603.
399. See Rafael Leal-Arcas & Antonio Morelli, The Resilience of the Paris Agreement:
Negotiating and Implementing the Climate Regime, 31 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 58 (2018)
(“The energy transition, which is happening at a slow pace, is an opportunity to protect the
planet, as is also an opportunity to create jobs and provide economic growth.”).
400. See DAVID PILLING, THE GROWTH DELUSION, WEALTH, POVERTY, AND THE
WELL-BEING OF NATIONS 165 (2018).
401. See id. at 12 (discussing example of Japan’s standard of living despite flat growth);
BANERJEE & DUFLO, supra note 53, at 85–87, 200–08 (discussing danger of growth scenarios when viewed as more than a proxy).
402. See supra Section III.A.
403. See James M. Otto, How Do We Legislate for Improved Community Development,
in EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES: THE MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES AS A DRIVER OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 673, 681 (Tony Addison & Alan Roe eds., 2018).
404. See generally CONGA NO VA, supra note 204, at 7–8.
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Third, we consider the degree of severe risk that potential policies and
project structures pose to human rights, environmental, and climate concerns.405 Intuitively, “ultra-hazardous [activities] require a much higher
standard of care.”406 The same logic applies to ordinary activities that are
known to have catastrophic accruing effects (i.e., emission of greenhouse
gases).407 In all instances in which there is a likelihood of harm, “legal
prudence” may well dictate that a more detailed assessment be done and
risk mitigation be more fully scrutinized.408 Human rights risks in global
supply chains also could be grouped in this category.409
Fourth, we ask what impact particular proposed approaches entail for
energy resilience. Energy systems that do not deliver resilient solutions
are likely to lead to stakeholder reactions, as we have seen.410 Such reactions can undermine the climate achievements of policies that were originally beneficial.411 Similar energy security concerns are arguably driving
China and India not to divest from coal-fired power plants as quickly as
might otherwise be possible.412 Plans that underperform on energy resilience therefore run the risk of failure because of stakeholder defection.
Consequently, diligence must bear this dimension in mind. Diligence
must anticipate this risk to be effective.
Fifth, we compare energy transition policies and projects to evolving
best practices.413 Projects typically require use of the best available technology at the time of investment in new infrastructure.414 These best
practices do not just focus on technology. They also focus on human
rights practices, such as community development design and project
structure.415 Underperforming in best practices requires an explanation
and suggests that conduct may not have been reasonable or
proportionate.416
As diligence is an obligation of conduct and not an obligation of result,
there is no correct outcome in this reasonableness exercise.417 Even “the
existence of an adverse EIA [does not] place any duty on the proposing
state to refrain from proceeding with a project, although in the final deci405. See generally BIRNIE, BOYLE & REDGWELL, supra note 335, at 148.
406. Id.
407. See Christopher Serkin & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Prospective Grandfathering:
Anticipating the Energy Transition Problem, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1019, 1037 n.74, 1055
(2018); Jeffrey A. Smith, The Implications of the Kyoto Protocol and the Global Warming
Debate for Business Transactions, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 511, 523–24 (2005).
408. Anderson & Bowers, supra note 282.
409. See generally Jaeger, supra note 197.
410. See Takahashi, supra note 353.
411. See BIRNIE, BOYLE & REDGWELL, supra note 335, at 169.
412. See Sourgens Consensus, supra note 120, at 1, 16, 20.
413. See generally BIRNIE, BOYLE & REDGWELL, supra note 335, at 148.
414. See Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, 88–89
(Apr. 20).
415. See Li-Wen Lin, Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility Legislation Around
the World: Emergent Varieties and National Experiences, 23 UNIV. PA. J. BUS. L. 429, 468
(2021).
416. See BIRNIE, BOYLE & REDGWELL, supra note 335, at 148.
417. See id. at 218.
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sion ‘due account’ must be taken of the findings.”418 The point is that we
consider specific data points in light of these different metrics to assess
what policy or project we should pursue. In extreme circumstances, the
judgment could well be unreasonable on its face. For example, the use of
forced labor deployed in the perpetration of genocide in any supply chain
is an unacceptable human rights impact—the urgency of energy transition
does not change that.419 In other circumstances, diligence will show that a
particular policy simply will not make the transition from policy test tubes
to application in reality (just consider the U.S. Metric Conversion Act
and look at road signs to confirm).420
Most instances will not be so extreme. Reasonable minds may differ.
Diligence tells us what data policymakers and executives need to consider
and how they need to approach this information in order to be reasonable. Yet, once they have done so, most any Pareto-optimal energy transition policy is acceptable subject to the limitations set out in the next
section.421
This result is very consistent with the bottom-up governance approach
underlying the current climate regime established in Paris in 2015.422 The
bottom-up approach grants stakeholders significant policy discretion to
chart their own path.423 If only one pathway were available, a bottom-up
approach would be meaningless. Instead, we would all need to follow the
same energy and climate trajectory. Inherent in a bottom-up governance
approach is that different policy priorities are consistent with the exercise
of diligent judgment. Some societies may value environmental sustainability more than energy resilience.424 They may be willing and able
to absorb the potential negative effect of reduced energy resilience.425
Yet other societies may prioritize differently.426 Both choices are dis418. Id. at 175.
419. See DINAH SHELTON, JUS COGENS 57 (2021) (prohibition against slavery is a jus
cogens norm); Philippe Sands, East West Street: Personal Stories About Life and Law, 16
WASH. UNIV. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 439, 453 (2017) (“Call something a genocide and it will
be on page one . . . .”); but see Ido Vock, Philippe Sands on the Uighurs: “Why Does it
Matter if We Call It a Genocide?,” NEW STATESMAN (July 28, 2020, 12:15 PM), https://
www.newstatesman.com/world/asia/2020/07/philippe-sands-uighurs-why-does-it-matter-ifwe-call-it-genocide [https://perma.cc/82TV-KUM3].
420. See Moni Basu, Refusing to Give an Inch: America’s Only Metric Road, CNN, https
://www.cnn.com/interactive/2015/07/us/metric-road-american-story [https://perma.cc/534KYE2N]. Interestingly, there is a cost to not being a member of the metric system from a
network perspective. See GREWAL, supra note 15, at 177.
421. See supra Section III.B.
422. See BODANSKY, BRUNNÉE & RAJAMANI, supra note 21, at 25. This bottom up approach falls between two modes of reconstituting an international society around shared
values. See GREWAL, supra note 15, at 190–91.
423. See BODANSKY, BRUNNÉE & RAJAMANI, supra note 21, at 25.
424. See Nikos Tsafos, In Defense of Energiewende, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L
STUD. (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/defense-energiewende [https://perma.
cc/TE6K-EYHM] (outlining German energy policies).
425. See Takahashi, supra note 353 (discussing the Texas power crisis).
426. See generally Frank Heinz, ERCOT Issues Weeklong Call for Energy Conservation
Continues, NBC DFW (June 14, 2021, 9:11 PM), https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/ercotissues-call-for-conservation-as-electricity-demand-surges-monday/2656613 [https://
perma.cc/2FNW-B9WW].
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tinctly diligent, even as they ultimately require fundamentally different
approaches to energy transition and climate governance.
One should not exaggerate the consequences of following a bottom-up
governance approach. As energy transition policies and projects gather
momentum, they will also generate more data. And as they generate
more data, they will make it more likely that successful policy choices will
impact future diligence exercises. Such success stories limit risk and provide a clearer blueprint for others to follow, which will, in turn, lock in
path dependencies in the same way as the QWERTY keyboard.427 Other
policies may be better in theory;428 the fact that infrastructure has grown
around a different approach is nevertheless going to favor following a
given path.429
Similarly, past policy choices will limit what can realistically be done
because each choice has consequences. A policy that underperforms on
climate ambition limits the paths available to avoid climate tipping
points.430 The path will also narrow to the extent that we have made bets
that did not pay off, even if those bets were reasonable at the outset. But
again, in those instances, diligence would build learning and adaptation
into the decision-making process itself. It would not mandate a result as
such.
Reasonableness, in other words, provides a broad yardstick in the first
instance to allow different actors to make different policy choices. Those
policy choices will be suboptimal given the nature of energy transition
challenges, as discussed in Part II. Yet, this alone should not be a reason
to critique those choices. On the contrary, it should be a reason to question how those choices were made and in what context they stand. Once
we learn from this context and the impact of those decisions, decisionmaking can adapt and learn appropriately from past experience.
Before we turn to the particular role of human rights, we can already
see a markedly different perspective from a political economy lens.431 If
energy transition policies are guided by legal principles, we can introduce
greater nuance in our assessments. It is not a matter of finding the single
most efficient path.432 It is a matter of finding a balance between different values we hold dear and different pathways that are available to us
because legal decision-making allows us to make use of more data points
as meaningful information.433 A greater amount of information means, in
the first place, that we see more obstacles. But this greater amount of
information also means there are ultimately a greater number of poten427. See Frédéric G. Sourgens, The Virtue of Path Dependence in the Law, 56 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 303, 308, 311 (2016) [hereinafter Sourgens Path Dependence].
428. See id. at 317.
429. See id. at 370; see also BANERJEE & DUFLO, supra note 53, at 102 (“Herd behavior
generates informational cascades: the information on which the first people base their decision will have an outsized influence on what all the others believe.”).
430. See Sourgens Consensus, supra note 120, at 11.
431. See IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 13.
432. See id. at 3.
433. See REISMAN, supra note 145, at 184.
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tial paths open to us. Different stakeholders can walk down these different paths and thus serve as laboratories for energy transition success.
Once more results are available to us, we can then make better decisions,
all things considered, than had we mandated a single path only from the
get-go. In Professor Ajibola’s words, this room for choice allows societies
to “own the process and . . . the structures in place for their
development.”434
V. THE PRIMACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS & THE RIGHT TO
DEVELOPMENT
So far, we have assumed that all metrics to measure energy transition
impacts were created equal. There is one important caveat. Constitutional
rights and human rights are a distinct first among equals. As I will argue
in this Part, this does not mean that human rights law replaces or otherwise overrules the other metrics of energy transition diligence. Rather, I
argue that any assessment that would force a reduction in the realization
of human rights in the name of energy transition would have to explain
itself.
This human rights preference is built into the core of the Paris climate
regime. The Paris regime expressly recognizes that “[p]arties should,
when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights.”435 It also lists specifically “the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local
communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in
vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender
equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity.”436 Any
reading of the Paris Agreement and climate mitigation obligations, therefore, has the realization of human rights and the right to development as
its object and purpose.
This focus on human rights makes fundamental sense. Energy transition alters the backbone of international economic cooperation.437 Such
international economic cooperation can lay claim to legitimacy only if it is
consistent with the value of human dignity.438 Any fundamental reorganization of the international economic order, therefore, should only be le434. HENISZ, supra note 230, at 98.
435. Paris Agreement, supra note 316, at 2.
436. Id. (emphasis added).
437. See Sourgens Consensus, supra note 120, at 7. NEPA currently places a premium
on such “human health, economic and social stability, ecosystem services or other benefits
that increase climate change preparedness or resilience.” NEPA-Guidance, supra note 45,
at 23.
438. See Antony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions, and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 243, 248 (2000); see
also ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, INTRNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM AND MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF INTERDEPENDENT PUBLIC GOODS 73 (2012) (taking a different approach to reach same conclusion); DESIERTO
PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 20, at 159 (arguing for an approach that does not integrate
international human rights law into international human rights law “but rather . . . show[s]
ways by which States Parties to the ICESCR can feasibly integrate their compliance with
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gitimate to the extent that it, too, is consistent with human dignity.439 The
object and purpose of human rights law is the protection and promotion
of human dignity.440 Consequently, human rights should have a central
place in energy transition governance: they must safeguard against violence to the equal moral worth of any human being for the convenience
of another.
The preference for human rights is not monolithic. Different human
rights can demand very different results. Relevantly, in the energy transition context, human rights require that states reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions—and thus change their energy infrastructure.441 But just as importantly, human rights also require that states provide appropriate access to electricity and energy.442 These two rights arguably are at odds
with each other, at least in the short-term.
The recent German Supreme Court case in Neubauer v. Germany addressed this particular issue.443 The court ruled that the German government was required to increase its energy transition ambition as a matter
of article 20(a) of the German Basic Law. Article 20(a) states that
“[m]indful also of its responsibility towards future generations, the state
shall protect the natural foundations of life and animals by legislation
and, in accordance with law and justice, by executive and judicial action,
all within the framework of the constitutional order.”444 This provision
reflects the human right to life and a principle of intergenerational
equity.445
As Matthias Goldmann insightfully noted in an analysis of the decision
shortly after it was promulgated, “[t]he novelty of this case . . . consists in
obligations under the ICESCR and treaty obligations within international trade, finance,
and investment law in IEL”).
439. See DESIERTO PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 20, at 159–60. Such consistency with
human dignity does not require a full integration of human rights norms, as Diane Desierto
convincingly argues.
440. Notably, human dignity is a purposefully ambiguous concept in human rights law
so as to allow a multiplicity of different ethical foundations. See Paolo G. Carozza, Human
Dignity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 345, 348
(Dinah Shelton ed., 2013). Even on this pluralist footing, dignity informs how human rights
law views the conditions in which human beings live—the right to housing, food, work,
social security, culture etc. See id. at 355–56. As Paolo Carozza notes, dignity here can have
a loadbearing function as “[i]nterestingly, although the American Convention on Human
Rights only protects economic and social rights very weakly, the Inter-American Court has
attached a robust notion of dignity to its interpretation and application of the right to life
that allows that right to include a guarantee of the minimal socio-economic conditions for a
life lived with dignity.” Id. at 356.
441. See, e.g., Urgenda, supra note 180, ¶ 5.7.9.
442. See generally Löfquist, supra note 179, at 711.
443. Neubauer, supra note 27, ¶¶ 30, 186.
444. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, art. 20(a) (Ger.), translation at
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html [https://perma.cc/X4GA2HD7].
445. See Jelena Bäumler, Sustainable Development Made Justiciable: The German Constitutional Court’s Climate Ruling on Intra- and Inter-Generational Equity, EJIL: TALK!
(June 8, 2021), https://www.ejiltalk.org/sustainable-development-made-justiciable-the-german-constitutional-courts-climate-ruling-on-intra-and-inter-generational-equity [https://
perma.cc/S472-PTCN].
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the skillful entanglement of international law and institutions with constitutional law.”446 As Professor Goldmann pointed out, the Neubauer court
makes three important moves. First, the court “crucially relies on the expertise provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC).”447 It thereby “resuscitates the functionalist hope in international institutions as havens of rational discourse, a rare quality in times
of societal polarization, spreading autocracy, mistrust in public institutions, and even state-sponsored misinformation.”448 Second, the Neubauer court “recognizes that the duty of the German government to
protect fundamental rights does not end at its borders, but covers people
abroad, including the group of plaintiffs living in Nepal and Bangladesh.”449 While foreign residents had standing to sue, the Neubauer
court relied on the Paris Agreement as a means to dismiss their suit on
the merits because “the government has met its duties to protect in the
case at hand, particularly by ratifying the 2015 Paris Agreement.”450 And
finally, the third step meets head on “the counter-majoritarian difficulty”
of confronting “a tragic choice between democracy today” (that is, upholding the legislative approach of the German parliament to climate
change mitigation) “and liberty tomorrow” (that is, protecting the right of
the children-plaintiffs in the Neubauer case).451 Neubauer “finds the impossible middle ground and holds the legislature accountable to its own
commitments;” that is, the commitments already subject to legislative approval of the Paris Agreement.452
Importantly, the Neubauer court’s focus was on core liberties, plural.
The Neubauer court allowed that climate change did not pose the kind of
risk that would allow the wholesale displacement of other rights.453 In
fact, part of the court’s motivation for its judgment was that greenhouse
gas emission reductions after 2030 might have to be achieved in such a
short timeframe and require such efforts as to threaten basic legally protected freedoms.454 The court reasoned that climate change mitigation
could be displaced as a policy imperative to the extent mitigation policies
disproportionately infringe upon other rights—but that “the relative
weight” of non—climate-neutral “exercise[s] of freedom . . . decreases as
climate change” worsens.455 Notably, the regulation of CO2 emissions becomes increasingly urgent under Article 20(a) of the Basic Law even
before tipping points are reached because it would be unrealistic to ex446. Matthias Goldmann, Judges for Future: The Climate Action Judgment as a
Postcolonial Turn in Constitutional Law?, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Apr. 30, 2021), https://
verfassungsblog.de/judges-for-future [https://perma.cc/A6K4-N9PJ].
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. See Neubauer, supra note 27, ¶ 120.
454. See id. ¶ 117.
455. Id. ¶ 120.
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pect—quite apart from constitutional concerns—that we tolerate CO2emitting conduct without any mitigation and then demand, when tipping
points are imminent, that conduct be immediately carbon neutral.456 In
other words, the impact of energy transition policies should be extended
over the longest time available to reduce the impairment of constitutionally protected liberties as the loss of liberty to switch to carbon neutral
conduct is negligible once a carbon neutral infrastructure is widely available.457 But this requires that we start as soon as possible and be as ambitious as possible as early as possible so as not to impermissibly shift
unconscionable liberty losses to future generations.
The reasoning of the German Constitutional Court is instructive because it uses a sustainable development lens.458 It reasons that energy
transition policies must sustainably allow development broadly conceived
to continue unimpeded by today’s policy choices.459 That is, it should not
impose an undue burden on either today’s economy or the future of children.460 And it does not allow any offsetting of human rights losses of one
group (persons living after 2030) against the human rights gains of the
current generation.461
This is broadly consistent with the right to development as that right is
currently codified in the draft Convention on the Right to Development.462 Centrally, Article 4 of the draft Convention states that the right
to development is inalienable.463 The right entitles every human person
“to participate in, contribute to and enjoy economic, social, cultural, civil
and political development that is consistent with and based on all other
human rights and fundamental freedoms.”464 Article 4(2) expounds,
“Every human person and all peoples have the right to active, free and
meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of
benefits resulting therefrom.”465 The Convention further expresses that
“all human and legal persons, peoples, groups[,] and States have the general duty under international law to refrain from participating in the violation of the right to development.”466 Article 22 expressly includes
sustainable development—that is, the ability of future generations to realize their right to development.467 The reasoning of the German Consti456. See id.
457. See id. ¶ 121.
458. See Bäumler, supra note 445. As such, it is compatible with the underlying public
trust rationale in U.S. climate actions such as Juliana, an action only dismissed on standing
grounds. See J.B. Ruhl & Thomas A.J. McGinn, The Roman Public Trust Doctrine: What
Was It, and Does It Support an Atmospheric Trust?, 47 ECOLOGY L.Q. 117, 120–21 (2020).
Prior NEPA guidance already hints at this dimension as an important diligence factor. See
NEPA-Guidance, supra note 45, at 20–22.
459. See generally Bäumler, supra note 445.
460. See id.
461. See id.
462. Development Convention, supra note 37, at 4.
463. Id. art. 4(1).
464. Id.
465. Id. art. 4(2).
466. Id. art. 7.
467. Id. art. 22.
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tutional Court in balancing the right to development of respective
generations follows the exact same logic by safeguarding as much of the
right as possible for all, thus, defending the ability of the right.468
The logic of the German Constitutional Court, as well as the draft Convention on the Right to Development, does not permit trade-offs between different groups. It requires a proportionate treatment of all
persons and does not permit one to benefit off the back of another.469
Energy transition policies in post-industrialized economies must not undermine the right to development of persons in the energy supply chain.
Similarly, policymakers must ensure that energy transition policies themselves do not undermine the right to development in industrializing and
natural resource-rich countries. This imposes significant duties of inquiry
and duties of risk mitigation and monitoring on proponents of energy
transition policies. Political economy approaches address either of these
human rights concerns only indirectly.470
This leaves unanswered what policymakers will need to establish in order to proceed with energy transition policies and projects should their
diligence reveal that energy transition policies do, in fact, impair the right
to development. Logically, policymakers need to establish that a proposed policy represents a reasonable path that least impairs the human
rights of the most affected group. That is, complete inaction itself is inconsistent with sustainable development because it makes future generations worse off for suffering the consequences of climate change. But
policymakers also need to establish that there is no reasonable path to
lessen the impact on those whose human rights are most impaired. At its
core, human dignity means that all human beings have equal moral
worth.471 This equal moral worth means that those most impaired would
need to agree in principle that their privation is unavoidable—that is,
they cannot be made better off without placing someone in a worse position than they are.472
This preference for human rights in a holistic diligence approach involving suboptimal outcomes still leaves a significant range of policy options on the table. It does not subordinate all other concerns to human
rights—it seeks to secure compliance with human rights in energy transition side by side with other concerns.473 Instead, this preference here provides a safeguard only. It limits policy options that would treat persons
not as ends in themselves but as means to our energy transition success.
We can differ in our judgments on the virtues of particular pathways in
468. See Neubauer, supra note 27, ¶¶ 117–20.
469. See id.; Development Convention, supra note 37, art. 4.
470. See supra Part I, Section III.A.
471. See Carozza, supra note 440, 348, 355–56.
472. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 108 (Otfried Höffe ed., Joost
den Haan, trans.) (2013). The argument here is not one of positive distribution of resources. Rather, it is one of a negative distribution of privations. See id. The argument
developed by Rawls, however, should hold the stronger in the second context.
473. See DESIERTO PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 20, at 158–61.
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many respects, but we cannot reasonably differ on this: to actively deprive others of their capacity to pursue a good human life in keeping with
their values, desires, hopes, and dreams simply on the basis of geography,
birth, or station must never be a policy option.474 A development backstop to energy transition diligence achieves at least that much.
VI. CONCLUSION: A DIFFERENT PATH
Where does this leave us? This Article has argued that diligence can
improve on approaches rooted solely in political economy. In particular,
it has argued that values and community autonomy are key drivers for
successful policy. The German Constitutional Court convincingly argues
that energy transition policies must be driven first and foremost by concerns for sustainable development.475 This sustainable development lens
begins and ends with the realization of rights.476 It does not look to the
efficiency of energy policy as the end all be all. As Professor Ajibola
powerfully reminded us, even the best technical solution is inconsistent
with sustainable development if communities affected by those solutions
did not own the process that led to their adoption.477 Inefficient solutions
that reflect our collective values, therefore, are both more sustainable in
their actual social context and support development in the full ethical
sense of the word rather than the narrowly economic sense.
As a practical matter, one key difference between the diligent zero lens
and the political economy lens concerns supply chains. Proposals rooted
in political economy approaches like the IEA Net Zero 2050 report made
supply chain assumptions that do not fully account for human rights concerns. This problem is particularly pressing in the context of the electrification of transportation.478 Due to the minerals needed for
electrification, supply chains pose significant environmental and human
rights hurdles.479 Such hurdles can only be overcome with diligent stakeholder engagement.480 But engagement takes time to do right, and the
timeframe necessary to prevent a climate disaster might not allow for
that.481 Policymakers and industries, therefore, could reasonably seek an
alternative to electrification.
A natural policy alternative is to rely on hydrogen-powered transportation as an alternative to electrification. This switch requires smaller,
lighter batteries in vehicles and thus fewer mineral resources,482 leaving
474. See generally Development Convention, supra note 37, art. 8(1).
475. Neubauer, supra note 27, ¶¶ 117–120.
476. See id.
477. See HENISZ, supra note 230, at 98.
478. See, e.g., IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 70–73.
479. See id.
480. See Part III.
481. See generally IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 70–73.
482. See Rachel Graham, Hydrogen Fuel Cell vs Electric Cars: What You Need to Know
but Couldn’t Ask, EURONEWS (March 14, 2020), https://www.euronews.com/green/2020/02/
13/hydrogen-fuel-cell-vs-electric-cars-what-you-need-to-know-but-couldn-t-ask [https://
perma.cc/3GCA-ABJS].
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us the time to get human rights and environmental diligence right. Hydrogen fuel cell vehicles already exist; all they need is infrastructure to
support them.483 This policy alternative also removes vehicles from the
grid, meaning that generating capacity is available to support other economic activities, including the cyber-economy.484 Japan and Japanese
manufacturers, as well as German policymakers, are currently investing
heavily in this alternative.485
Another policy alternative that may become more attractive is a reengagement with nuclear and small-scale modular nuclear power.486 Current proposals like the IEA Net Zero 2050 report allow a reasonably limited role for nuclear power in the energy mix.487 Stakeholders may view
the environmental risks of nuclear power differently. Nuclear power is a
carbon neutral and highly resilient form of energy.488 This is an option
available for policymakers looking to decrease greenhouse gas emissions
while increasing available generating capacity beyond the limitations of
renewable energy (France is an early adopter, China is currently looking
to expand traditional nuclear capabilities, and the United States and the
United Kingdom are increasing small modular reactor investments).489
Policymakers who want to avoid the environmental risk of nuclear power
like Germany can follow a different calculus490—perhaps it is no surprise
that these countries tend to be the ones that look to hydrogen as an alternative to electrification of transportation.491
Some other policy alternatives are important because they change the
climate equation from the other end. It is possible to change the carbon
equation without altering the backbone of energy infrastructure. One
483. See id.
484. See supra Part I.
485. See Dvorak, supra note 42 (discussing Japan); Germany Investing _8B+ in 62
Large-Scale Hydrogen Projects; “We Are Making Germany a Hydrogen Country,” GREEN
CAR CONGRESS (May 29, 2021), https://www.greencarcongress.com/2021/05/20210529germanyh2.html [https://perma.cc/QL3R-3LSL].
486. See Huber, supra note 42, at 469, 475, 476; Daniel Garton, Richard Hill, Dipen
Sabharwal, Andrew de Lotbinière McDougall, Kirsten Odynski & Vit Stehliı́k, Why Small
Modular Reactors Will Shape The Future of Nuclear Debate, WHITE & CASE (June 8, 2021),
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/why-small-modular-reactors-will-shape-future-nuclear-debate [https://perma.cc/QES3-NHK6] (discussing small modular reactors).
487. IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 39 fig. 1.8.
488. See id. at 14.
489. See id. at 37; Garton, Hill, Sabharwall, Lotbinière, Odynski & Stehliı́k, supra note
486 (discussing U.S. and U.K. policies supporting small modular nuclear reactors); Anmar
Frangoul, France’s Love Affair with Nuclear Power Will Continue, but Change is Afoot,
CNBC (Mar. 10, 2021, 5:12 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/10/frances-love-affair-with
-nuclear-power-will-continue-but-change-is-afoot-.html [https://perma.cc/87QT-GMN8].
But see Lisa Bryant, France Takes First Steps to Reduce Nuclear Energy Dependence,
VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS (Feb. 21, 2020, 1:29 PM), https://www.voanews.com/europe/
france-takes-first-steps-reduce-nuclear-energy-dependence [https://perma.cc/F5JPHWYW] (“[T]he government’s broader energy strategy [is] to reduce French dependence
on nuclear energy from supplying three-quarters of its electricity to about half by 2035.”).
490. See How Fukushima Triggered Germany’s Nuclear Phaseout, DEUTSCHE WELLE
(Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.dw.com/en/how-fukushima-triggered-germanys-nuclearphaseout/a-56829217 [https://perma.cc/Y634-ALBG] (discussing German phase out).
491. See Dvorak, supra note 42; GREEN CAR CONGRESS, supra note 485.
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such strategy is to remove CO2 emissions from large emission source
points.492 This technology is known as Carbon Capture Utilization and
Storage, or CCUS.493 The technology is currently in scaled experimental
use.494 If scaled up further, this technology will likely change the carbon
intensity of our existing energy infrastructure.495 Gas-fired power plants
could become almost carbon neutral.496 This, in turn, extends the window
within which we can get energy transition right and provides a smoother,
flatter curve with more opportunity for global adaptation. Policymakers,
supermajors, and leading national oil companies are currently supporting
such kickstarter projects on the Gulf Coast in Texas and Louisiana; on the
Adriatic coast in Italy; in Teesside, United Kingdom; in Edmonton, Canada; in Rotterdam, the Netherlands; with the Northern Lights/Longship
project in Norway; and with the China North-West hub in mainland
China.497
It is possible to take this approach one step further: “Mining” CO2 directly from the air is technologically feasible.498 The technology is known
as direct air capture or DAC.499 This approach would not reduce emissions, but it would reduce the amount of CO2 currently in the atmosphere.500 If brought to scale, this technology would allow us to reverse
trendlines and achieve negative emissions.501 Before achieving negative
emissions, it would allow us to complement emission reductions from energy infrastructure upgrades with emission reductions from carbon
removal.502
Both CCUS and direct air capture are expensive technologies.503 Both
are at a relatively early stage of development—with CCUS closer to full492. See, e.g., Kintisch, supra note 186 at 33, 41–51.
493. CCUS Hubs, OIL & GAS CLIMATE INITIATIVE, https://www.ogci.com/action-andengagement/removing-carbon-dioxide-ccus/our-kickstarter-hubs [https://perma.cc/F6V3DVGX].
494. Id.
495. See id.
496. See INT’L ENERGY AG., THE ROLE OF CCUS IN LOW-CARBON POWER SYSTEMS
15, 25 (July 2020), https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ccdcb6b3-f6dd-4f9a-98c38366f4671427/The_role_of_CCUS_in_low-carbon_power_systems.pdf [https://perma.cc/
526F-KEEB].
497. CCUS Hubs, supra note 493.
498. Tito Jankowski, Start Here: An Introduction to Mining 1 Trillion Tons of CO2
From the Air, AIR MINING 101, https://coda.io/@tito/air-mining-101 [https://perma.cc/P7
VL-RPHG]. See also Nils Rokke, The Carbon Negative Solutions That Remove CO2 From
the Atmosphere, FORBES (Dec. 1, 2020, 4:06 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nilsrokke/
2020/12/01/the-carbon-negative-solutions-that-remove-co2-from-the-atmosphere/
?sh=20fecc96488d [https://perma.cc/HZ7M-EQDM].
499. Anja Chalmin, Direct Air Capture: Recent Developments and Future Plans,
GEOENGINEERING MONITOR (July 16, 2019), https://www.geoengineeringmonitor.org/2019/
07/direct-air-capture-recent-developments-and-future-plans [https://perma.cc/67WH9M9F].
500. See Rokke, supra note 498.
501. See id.
502. See id.
503. See id.
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scale implementation.504 That being said, market mechanisms exist to
transfer the cost of development of these technologies to the private sector.505 Such mechanisms could be further explored. Further, these market
mechanisms could become additional means to provide enforcement
mechanisms for diligence in energy transition planning.
Finally, we have it in our power today to reduce global temperatures
with solar radiation management.506 Such solar radiation management reproduces and escalates volcanic eruptions.507 In doing so, it blocks out
sunlight before it enters the atmosphere.508 By reducing the energy that
enters the atmosphere, we can take warming potential out of the equation before it even enters.509 As it stands, this technology can be deployed
today at comparatively low costs.510
This technology itself is ultra-hazardous and poses significant environmental risks.511 Given these risks, it has remained on the outside of mainstream discussions, though this trend has recently changed. The National
Academies of Science recently urged the U.S. government to study its
use.512 There is a simple reason for this: a sustainable, equitable energy
transition is likely to require more time than we currently have.513 This
means we must consider taking measures that will allow us to hit a pause
button so that we can complete an equitable, sustainable energy transition in the time needed to do it right. Solar radiation management may be
our best means to do so. But determining whether that is the case will
require additional diligence—diligence it is high time to start.514
So far, my account of possible alternative energy futures in this Part
has focused on different “whats.” I have outlined what policymakers
might do differently if they follow legal diligence as opposed to a political
economy approach. But these different whats are secondary to my argument. Legal diligence does not offer energy transition policymakers a different what. It offers a different “how.”
The red thread running through Diligent Zero is that how we transition
energy matters. That how is about making decisions premised on our best
possible understanding of facts and of the future consequences of our
504. See CCUS Hubs, supra note 493 (discussing CCUS); Our Technology, CARBON
ENGINEERING, https://carbonengineering.com/our-technology [https://perma.cc/JM7HBWVK] (describing status of technology for one leading DAC company); Direct Air Capture to Help Reverse Climate Change, CLIMEWORKS, https://climeworks.com/co2-removal
[https://perma.cc/MYM8-L24G]
505. See Sourgens Consensus, supra note 120, at 47–48.
506. See What Is SRM?, THE MGMT. DEGREES INITIATIVE, https://www.srmgi.org/whatis-srm [https://perma.cc/2YL2-2WY6].
507. DAVID KEITH, A CASE FOR CLIMATE ENGINEERING 11 (2013).
508. What Is SRM?, supra note 506.
509. See id.
510. See KEITH, supra note 507, at 21.
511. See CLIVE HAMILTON, EARTHMASTERS: THE DAWN OF THE AGE OF CLIMATE ENGINEERING 200–02, 208–10 (2013).
512. Tollefson, supra note 44.
513. See id.
514. See id.
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conduct.515 Diligence requires us to make decisions with eyes wide open
to the risks we must accept.516 Just as importantly, the how has also highlighted the need for all affected communities to have an equal seat at the
table from beginning to end.517 Human dignity demands that all have an
active voice in determining their own fate.518 It demands that this voice
be taken seriously. Any socioeconomic reform that fails to provide those
affected by reform an active voice or fails to listen to that voice is acting
inconsistently with fundamental human rights.519 It gets development
wrong.520
For all to have an active voice in their own fate, we must be empowered to make decisions.521 Making decisions means choosing, even if the
choice we must ultimately make is utterly clear.522 That is why alternative
pathways are important and why this section has outlined a few different
whats of energy transition to highlight that the how of energy transition is
still very much a matter of our own moral, political, and economic
agency. Law at its best supports that agency. It provides a meaningful
place for expertise in detailing the likely outcomes of our choices.523 But
it does not prescribe what choice must be made.524 No one expert holds
the final card. We, as world society and affected communities within
world society, do.
If we empower world society to make decisions about energy transition
diligently, we have the tools to see it through to success. World society
can, in fact, raise the $100 trillion long-term price tag needed for deep
restructuring of the energy sector to succeed.525 It can do so because no
one sector need carry the load alone. States, international organizations,
energy companies, mining companies, lenders, and institutional investors
together have the financial wherewithal to meet that goal.526 What is
more, we stand at an unparalleled moment of human ingenuity—an ingenuity that now can draw on a global knowledge base with leading scientists hailing not just from the old European Great Powers and the United
States but from recently industrialized powers like the BRIC states and a
new crop of states like Uganda, Indonesia, and beyond.527 We can mar515. See supra Section III.A.
516. See supra Section III.B.
517. See supra Section III.C.
518. See supra Part IV.
519. See id.
520. See generally HENISZ, supra note 230, at 123–24.
521. See generally MALCOLM SCHOFIELD, THE STOIC IDEA OF THE CITY 48–50 (1991).
522. See id. at 49.
523. See supra Sections III.A–B.
524. See supra Part III.
525. See IEA-2050 Report, supra note 7, at 81 fig. 2.22.
526. See GDP (current US$), THE WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD [https://perma.cc/QUQ6-4NNL] (calculating global GDP as 84.68 trillion USD).
527. See Qinchang Gui, Chengliang Liu & Debin Du, Globalization of Science and International Scientific Collaboration: A Network Perspective, 105 GEOFORUM 1, 2 (2019);
Peter Ndichu, Technological Innovation Solves Challenges and Drives Scale in Uganda,
GSMA (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/blog/technological-
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shal this ingenuity to solve technical problems because the world economy we have built brims with high tech production centers on every
continent but one.528 What is missing is the collective will to fully embrace our decisions about possible energy futures as our own. This is what
diligent zero adds more than anything else. It provides a pathway to engage and empower all of us to participate in this most vital of tasks: to
rebuild the backbone of our world economy and transform energy systems into an equitable and sustainable bedrock for global cooperation.

innovation-solves-challenges-and-drives-scale-in-uganda [https://perma.cc/RYE2-E3LG];
Tahsin Saadi Sedik, Asia’s Digital Revolution, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Sept. 2018), https://
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7NRB-Z9MQ]; Ricardo Navarro, Chile Is a Technological Reference when It Comes to
Foreign Partnerships, FORBES (Mar. 18, 2020, 7:20 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/for
bestechcouncil/2020/03/18/chile-is-a-technological-reference-when-it-comes-to-foreignpartnerships/?sh=3f2c3b812b6b [https://perma.cc/54U3-GUUD].
528. There are no such facilities in Antarctica. See Abigail Ng, India Is Set to Become a
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https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/15/covid-india-could-play-an-important-role-in-producingvaccines.html [https://perma.cc/AA3G-UT3R]; COVID: South Africa to Host Vaccine Tech
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476

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

